The Need for Virtue Ethics in the Counterintelligence Community Dissertation Or Thesis Complete

CI FinalAbstractThis thesis describes the need for an ethical standard in counterintelligence (CI) so as to facilitate collaboration among the various CI agencies and the private sector. It conducts an analysis of the formation of the counterintelligence program under Angleton, the use of CI within the Federal Bureau of Narcotics under Anslinger, and the use of CI in the Phoenix Program and the FBIs COINTELPRO. This analysis is used to highlight what went wrong with counterintelligence and how those problems can be prevented in the future. It uses a combination of conflict theory, structural functionalism and critical theory to explore the dimensions of counterintelligence from a comparative case study approach. The aim of this qualitative research is to provide an ethical framework that could be used to help the counterintelligence enterprise collaborate more effectively with the private sector in the future. The suggested ethical framework is one of virtue ethics, with character education becoming a part of agent training, and the development of a character-based culture rather than a Cold War-based culture being implemented in the CI community.IntroductionIntelligence and counterintelligence operations have always been a part of the American Republic (Federation of American Scientists 1996). General Washington was aware of the threat of foreign espionage and the need to counter it (Wettering 2000, 165). The need to deceive those whose intention is to deceive ones nation is in fact an ancient one, identified by Sun Tzu thousands of years ago (Select Committee on Intelligence 1986). Practicing deception while remaining free from the corrupting influences of deceivers has proven to be a challenge, however (Valentine 2016, 45). The circumstances under which counterintelligence in the US was formerly developed and pursued in its infancy, childhood, and adolescence could be said to have predicted what that program would become in its adulthood. Abuses, errors and mistakes were so rampant that the CIAs counterintelligence program, run by James Jesus Angleton from inception in the 1950s to the 1970s, effectively had to be reconstructed by Colby, facing pressure from Congress and the public (Church Committee 1976, 171). The problem of ethics in counterintelligence was one that to this day has yet to be adequately answered. However, by understanding what counterintelligence was in the beginning, one may be better situated to understand what it is today and why its policies are what they are. By learning from the mistakes made in the past, a better foundation can be set in place for the future.Both Angleton and the era in which the counterintelligence program was formerly organized shaped the nature of counterintelligence at a time when the nation itself was buckling under the stress of paranoia, anger, frustration and mistrust (Valetine 2016, 23; Wettering 2000, 165). To some degree, the nation has never recovered from the stresses of the post-war climate that birthed the counterintelligence program in America (Valentine 2016, 9). When Director Colby dismissed Angleton from his position as head of counterintelligence at the CIA, Colby inherited a Staff that was by that time a full-grown adult. Facing political, social, and economic pressures, the CIA was compelled to reorganize, and as the Church Committee reported, it was an end of an era in CIA counterintelligence (Church Committee 1976, 171). Yet, the consequences of that era remained. The structure that Angleton had created and the nature of counterintelligence itself had already come into being, much like Frankensteins monster. Victor Frankenstein rejected his own creation, but that did not mean the creation ceased to exist. In fact, the creation went on to destroy the creator.Such an ominous analogy may be appropriate, at least according to Wettering (2000), the…

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…CIFinalAbstractThisthesisdescribestheneedforanethicalstandardincounterintelligence(CI)soastofacilitatecollaborationamongthevariousCIagenciesandtheprivatesector.ItconductsananalysisoftheformationofthecounterintelligenceprogramunderAngleton,theuseofCIwithintheFederalBureauofNarcoticsunderAnslinger,andtheuseofCIinthePhoenixProgramandtheFBIsCOINTELPRO.Thisanalysisisusedtohighlightwhatwentwrongwithcounterintelligenceandhowthoseproblemscanbepreventedinthefuture.Itusesacombinationofconflicttheory,structuralfunctionalismandcriticaltheorytoexplorethedimensionsofcounterintelligencefromacomparativecasestudyapproach.Theaimofthisqualitativeresearchistoprovideanethicalframeworkthatcouldbeusedtohelpthecounterintelligenceenterprisecollaboratemoreeffectivelywiththeprivatesectorinthefuture.Thesuggestedethicalframeworkisoneofvirtueethics,withcharactereducationbecomingapartofagenttraining,andthedevelopmentofacharacter-basedcultureratherthanaColdWar-basedculturebeingimplementedintheCIcommunity.IntroductionIntelligenceandcounterintelligenceoperationshavealwaysbeenapartoftheAmericanRepublic(FederationofAmericanScientists1996).GeneralWashingtonwasawareofthethreatofforeignespionageandtheneedtocounterit(Wettering2000,165).Theneedtodeceivethosewhoseintentionistodeceiveonesnationisinfactanancientone,identifiedbySunTzuthousandsofyearsago(SelectCommitteeonIntelligence1986).Practicingdeceptionwhileremainingfreefromthecorruptinginfluencesofdeceivershasproventobeachallenge,however(Valentine2016,45).ThecircumstancesunderwhichcounterintelligenceintheUSwasformerlydevelopedandpursuedinitsinfancy,childhood,andadolescencecouldbesaidtohavepredictedwhatthatprogramwouldbecomeinitsadulthood.Abuses,errorsandmistakesweresorampantthattheCIAscounterintelligenceprogram,runbyJamesJesusAngletonfrominceptioninthe1950stothe1970s,effectivelyhadtobereconstructedbyColby,facingpressurefromCongressandthepublic(ChurchCommittee1976,171).Theproblemofethicsincounterintelligencewasonethattothisdayhasyettobeadequatelyanswered.However,byunderstandingwhatcounterintelligencewasinthebeginning,onemaybebettersituatedtounderstandwhatitistodayandwhyitspoliciesarewhattheyare.Bylearningfromthemistakesmadeinthepast,abetterfoundationcanbesetinplaceforthefuture.BothAngletonandtheerainwhichthecounterintelligenceprogramwasformerlyorganizedshapedthenatureofcounterintelligenceatatimewhenthenationitselfwasbucklingunderthestressofparanoia,anger,frustrationandmistrust(Valetine2016,23;Wettering2000,165).Tosomedegree,thenationhasneverrecoveredfromthestressesofthepost-warclimatethatbirthedthecounterintelligenceprograminAmerica(Valentine2016,9).WhenDirectorColbydismissedAngletonfromhispositionasheadofcounterintelligenceattheCIA,ColbyinheritedaStaffthatwasbythattimeafull-grownadult.Facingpolitical,social,andeconomicpressures,theCIAwascompelledtoreorganize,andastheChurchCommitteereported,itwasanendofanerainCIAcounterintelligence(ChurchCommittee1976,171).Yet,theconsequencesofthateraremained.ThestructurethatAngletonhadcreatedandthenatureofcounterintelligenceitselfhadalreadycomeintobeing,muchlikeFrankensteinsmonster.VictorFrankensteinrejectedhisowncreation,butthatdidnotmeanthecreationceasedtoexist.Infact,thecreationwentontodestroythecreator.Suchanominousanalogymaybeappropriate,atleastaccordingtoWettering(2000),theretiredCentralIntelligenceAgencyoperationsofficer,whooversawclandestineoperationsinEuropeandAfricaformorethanthreedecades.DirectorColbycertainlyfeltasmuchinthe1970s,whenitbecameapparentthatthechildthefederalgovernmenthadrearedintoadulthoodwasnotexactlywhatthestatehadhopedfor.TheChurchCommitteenotedthatby1976theissuesfacingthecounterintelligenceprogramwerehowbesttoprotecttheUnitedStates,includingtheproperdegreeofcompartmentationofCIinformation,methodsofoperation,approachestosecurity,researchpriorities,extentofliaisoncooperation,andemphasisondeceptionactivities(ChurchCommittee1976,172).OnedominantissuetheSenateuncoveredwasthelackofcooperationamongthevariousagenciesonthecounterintelligencefront(Wettering2000,270).TensionbetweentheCIAandtheFBIhadbeenhighsincetheformersbirth,andwhilethetwoagenciescouldboastofacollaborativespiritinthe1970s,thelackofanysubstantialcounterintelligenceofficeintheFBImeantthatthebulkoftheworkwascoordinatedbytheCIA.WilliamEvnina,directoroftheNationalCounterintelligenceandSecurityCenter,hasgonesofarastowarnthatthechallengeofcounterintelligenceisnolongeronethegovernmentcanaddressonitsown,thattheprivatesectormustbearsomeoftheburdenandweightofprotectingdataandensuringdigitalsecurityinthefaceofsnoopingforeignactors(Nakashima2020).AnadditionalconsiderationputforwardbyTromblay(2017)isthattechnologyhasdevelopedrapidlyinthelasttwodecadesalone,andthecounterintelligenceprogramhasbeenslowtocrossthegenerationaldividebetweenitselfandthedigitalnativesofthe21stcenturywhohavegrownupusingtechnology.Inresponsetotheriseofnew,globaltechnologicaladvances,thecounterintelligenceprogramhasappearedmuchlikeamemberofanoldergenerationattemptingtocatchuponwhatmembersofyoungergenerationstakeforgranted.Tromblay(2017)callsittheproblemofcounterintelligencesreactionaryorientationacharacteristicoftheprogramthatwasdefinedbythecircumstancesofitsbirth.Moreover,withsomuchdatanowinthehandsofprivateindustry,thereisanincreasedneedforcounterintelligencetoworkmorecloselywithprivateindustry.Intelligenceoperationshavealwaysincludedworkwithinprivateindustry,butinmanycasesthisworkwascompromisedbyconflictsofinterest(Valentine2016,40).ResearchQuestionandPurposeTheresearchquestionis:HowcantheUScounterintelligenceenterprisesupportcollaborationamongthevariousUSICmembersandtheprivatesectorinanethicalandproductivemanner?Tounderstandtheissuesandpoliciesofcounterintelligencetoday,itisworthexaminingidentifyingthemistakesandlessonsthatcanbelearnedfromthepastwhenthecounterintelligenceprogramformallybeganunderAngleton.Thepurposeofthisstudyistoproposeastandardizedethicalframeworkforguidingthecounterintelligenceprogramasitworkstocollaboratewiththeprivatesectorinthe21stcentury.ResearchDesignAcomparativecasestudyapproachisusedinthisresearch.Thecasestudyanalysisfocusesonthreeareasinparticular,1)theuseofcounterintelligenceintheCIAundercounterintelligenceChiefJamesJesusAngleton;2)theconflationofcounterintelligencewithoutcounterinsurgencyintheFBIsCOINTELPROandthePhoenixProgram,and3)theuseofcounterintelligencebytheFederalBureauofNarcotics(FBN).Becausethereisnostandardethicalframeworkincounterintelligence,itpresentsaproblembecauseoftheriskofsubjectiveorquestionablemoralityseepingintocounterintelligenceactivities(Valentine2016).Tounderstandtheproblem,thisresearchdesignisappropriatelyqualitative,asthesubjectisexploratoryinnature.TheaimoftheresearchistoexplorebywayofcomparativecasestudyanalysisthecounterintelligenceprogramunderJamesJesusAngleton,CIinthePhoenixProgramandtheFBIsCOINTELPRO,andCIintheFBN.Scholarlyarticles,Senatereports,memoirs,independentresearch,biographies,andanalysishaveservedasthesourcesofinformation.ThepurposeforthisapproachcanbestbeunderstoodinthelightofEriksonsmodelofhumandevelopment,whichenablespsychologiststounderstandtheadultbyexaminingtheage-relatedconflictsthatmustbeovercomebeforethechildcanproceedsuccessfullytolaterstagesofdevelopment(ShrinerandShriner2014).ByexaminingtheearlystagesofcounterintelligenceunderAngleton,onemaygaininsightinunderstandingthepoliciesandissuesofcounterintelligencetodaybyexaminingtheearlydaysofthecounterintelligenceprogramasitgrewthroughitsinfancy,childhoodandadolescencestagesofthepost-war/ColdWarera(Valentine2016,10).Thisstudywillexplorehowconflictsofinterestsandrelationshipsandalackofethicalstandardsledtoproblemsincounterintelligence.Thecomparativecasestudyapproachisarobustonebecauseitallowsfortriangulationofresearch.TheappropriatemodelforthisapproachisthatofGeorgeandBennett(2004),whichusesastructured-focusedresearchdesign.Itishelpfultofirstdefinetheconcepts,theoriesandsystemsofethicsthatwillbediscussedinthisstudy.ConflictTheoryMarxismistherootofconflicttheory,butRalfDahrendorfpromotedconflicttheorybycomparingittostructuralfunctionalismandarguingthatsocietieshavetwoorientationsortwofaces(RitzerandStepinsky2017,120).Onefacesuggestscooperation,consensusandagreement;theotherfacesuggestsconflictbetweenaclasswithpowerandaclasswithout.Conflictbetweenthesetwofacesiswhatexplains,accordingtothistheory,theactionsofindividualsandinstitutions.CounterintelligenceBellaby(2012)definescounterintelligenceasanyactionoractivitythatisknowinglydesignedandintendedtoencourageanaudienceofsomesorttobelieveinsomethingwhichisuntrue(147).Typically,counterintelligence(CI)isassociatedwithmisleadingordupinganadversarysoastopreventthatadversaryfromgainingacrucialadvantageoveronesownposition.CIisasimportantintheprivatesectorasitisinthepublicsectortoday,asinformationhasbecomeavitalresourceinthedigitalage.CriticalTheoryCriticaltheorystemsfromthepost-MarxistviewthattherevolutionpredictedbyMarxfailedtooccurbecauseofculturalfactorsandinstitutionsthatpreventedtheclasswithoutpowerfromfulfillingtheirMarxistmandate.Thistheoryexploresthereasonsandwaysthecultureofthosewithpowerisusedtopreventthosewithoutpowerfromrisinguptochallengethosewithpower(Horkheimer1972).ThetheoryassumesthatMarxwascorrectinpredictingaworkeruprising.DutyEthicsKantputforwardtheconceptofdeontology,alsoknownasdutyethics.Theconceptisthatmoralityisdeterminedbytheextenttowhichonedoesonesdutyofstate(Messilbrook2013).Dutycanbedictatedbyanauthority,andthatiswhycounterintelligencehasbeendescribedasadutyinthepast(PfaffandTiel2004).Thelinebetweendutytostateandpersonalambition,however,hasbeencrossedinnumerabletimesthroughoutthehistoryofcounterintelligence(Morley2017;Valentine2016).Thismakesdeontologyacomplicatedframeworkwithseriouslimitationsintermsofutilityandapplication.EthicalEgoismEthicalegoismisthenotionthattheendsjustifythemeansandsolongasonecanidentifyapersonalbenefittowhatonedoes,itcanbemorallyjustified.Essentially,itgoesagainstthenotionofKantsdeontologybyadvocatingsubjectivedesireoverexternalduty(ONeill1989).However,Sheppard(2012)explainsthattheworldofdeceptionthatrunsthroughcounterintelligencealignswiththegeneraltenorofethicalegoism(19).Sheppards(2012)suggestionimpliesthatanunhealthysubjectivecharacteranimatestheCIcommunity.LockeanEthicsLockesviewwasthatlibertyisthefundamentallawofnatureandthatthestateshouldpreservelibertyinsofarasitisable(Pettit1997).Lockeanethicsasasystemdoesnotexistotherthanintheadvocacyoffreedomforaction.Thisisaproblematicethicalframeworkbecauseitcanbranchoffintwodirectionsatonceonewaytoutilitarianisminwhichlibertyiscurbedonlybyutilitytothecommongood;theotherwaytoethicalegoisminwhichtheendsjustifythemeans.StructuralFunctionalismStructuralfunctionalismisatheorythatexplainssocialorganizationintermsofhowrelationshipsandinstitutionsworktogethertobringstabilityandfunctionalitytoacommunity(RitzerandStepinsky2017).Ratherthanidentifyingtheproblematicnatureoftheserelationshipsandhowoppressionmayfigureintotheequation,thistheoryidentifiesthepositiveaspectsoftheserelationships.Itsinversetheoreticalapproachcouldbecalledconflicttheory.UtilitarianEthicsUtilitarianismdefinesthemoralactionasthatwhichhasthegreatestcommongood(Carson2010).However,ithasnoframeworkfordefiningthegoodunlikeinthesystemofvirtueethics,whichassociatesthegoodwithtranscendentalidealsthatformapersonscharacterastheyarepursuedinthoughtandaction.VirtueEthicsAlsoknownascharacterethics,virtueethicsisnotuniquetotheWestbutwasembracedequallyintheEastforthousandsofyears.IntheWest,itdatesbacktoAristotle;intheEast,toConfucius(Slingerland2011).Thebasicideaofvirtueethicsisthatactionsaredeemedmoraliftheycontributetothecultivationanddevelopmentofonescharacter.Characterandreputationgotogetherasindividualsinsocietyjudgeoneanotherbasedonreputation,whichservesastheindicatorofthepersonscharacter.Astatethathastarnisheditsreputationthroughbadfaithinteractionssignalsanuntrustworthycharacterandthusrisksexclusionfromalargernetworkofinternationalcollaboration(Mattox2002).ChapterOutlineThisthesisfirstprovidesareviewofliteraturethatfocusesonfourthemes:theproblematicnatureofdeception,theroleofethicsinCI,theneedforaframeworkforanalyzingtheworkofCIinthepast,andthelackofclarityandcollaborationintheCIcommunity.Thethirdchapterdiscussesthemethodologyusedforthisresearch.Thefourthchapterpresentsthefindingsandthefifthchapterdiscussesthefindings.LiteratureReviewTheaimofthisexaminationoftheliteratureistofillthewidegapthatremainsincounterintelligenceresearchregadinganappropriateethicalstandardthatcanguideandfosteranethicalculture,ascalledforbyBellaby(2012)andValentine(2016).Thepurposeofthisreviewistoidentifythelessonsthathavebeenlearnedandpresentedbyresearchersonthistopic,andtoidentifyanappropriatetheoreticalframeworkforassessingthewayforward.Theresearchquestionforthisstudyis:HowcantheUScounterintelligenceenterprisesupportcollaborationamongthevariousUSICmembersandtheprivatesectorinanethicalandproductivemanner?Theultimatepurposeofthisstudyistoproposeastandardizedethicalframeworkforguidingthecounterintelligenceprogramasitworkstocollaboratewiththeprivatesectorinthe21stcentury.Therefore,thethemesthisreviewexaminesare:1)theproblematicnatureofdeceptioninintelligencework;2)theroleofethicsincounterintelligence;3)aframeworkforanalyzingthepast;and4)theneedforclarityandcollaborationincounterintelligenceeffortsamongthevariousagencies,organizationsandactors.TheProblematicNatureofDeceptionDeceptionisatthecoreofcounterintelligence:yet,itisaproblematiccorebecauseofthecorruptionassociatedwithdeceptioninethicalsystems.Mattox(2002),forexample,observedthatthepracticeofdeceptionissubjecttolimitationsimposedbythedemandsofmorality(4).Mattox(2002)makesthegoodpointthatintelligenceprofessionalsmustactingoodfaithevenwiththosewhoaretheiradversaries(4).Yet,thispointisnotsupportedbyallresearchers,includingCohen(2016),whoarguesthattherearenomorallimitsonmilitarydeception.Mattox(2002)makesthebetterargumentfornumerousreasons:first,hesupportshisargumentwithamoralframeworkthatisjustifiablebasedonlong-termresults,whichMattox(2002)callsthelimitationoflong-termnegativeeffects.Whendeceptionisusedcautiouslyandmorally,theadversaryismorewillingtoacceptitasanormofstateconflict;moreover,theadversary,whomaybecomeastateallyinthefuture,willnotholdanyill-willonthisaccount(Mattox2002).Butwhenmorallimitsareoff,asCohen(2016)suggestsshouldbethecase,thereisnofoundationforfuturetrust.Cohens(2016)argumentfailsbecauseitisbasedonazerosumgameapproachtostatecraft:Cohen(2016)doesnotanticipatetherealityoftheveryrealpossibilityofandneedforcollaborationandpartnershipwithstatesthatareadversariestodaybutpotentialalliesinthefuture.Cohen(2016)implicitlyviewstheentireactofcounterintelligencefromthestandpointofethicalegoism,whichishighlyproblematicbothfromarationalandethicalstandpointbutalsofromapoliticalstandpoint(Lyons1976).PartofthereasonforCohens(2016)problematicpositioniscultural:Cohen(2016)comesfromaJewishtraditionalofrevolutionarybehaviorinwhichdominanceisalwaystheendgoal(Jones2008).Othercultures,bothWesternandEastern,havetendedtopromoteapositionofstatecraftthatisinlinewiththedoctrineofmutualbeneficenceputforwardbyAdamSmithinWealthofNations.BothWesternandEasternculturesdevelopedthefirstandmostfundamentalethicalframeworkinvirtueethics,withAristotlesummarizingtheframeworkinancientGreeceandConfuciussummarizingtheframeworkinancientChinathousandsofyearsago(Hursthouse2016).Cohens(2016)positionisnotrootedinsuchatraditionbutratherinthetraditionofelitismthathastendedtocharacterizesomenationsapproachestostatecraftinthemodernera.Withoutimposingmoralconditionsoncounterintelligence,thepossibilityofdevelopingtrustingrelationshipsinthefutureislost.Cohen(2016)hasnoanswertothisbecausehisviewiscoloredbyazerosumgamementality,whichisthatallthatmattersiswinning.Cohens(2016)viewalignswellwiththeformermottooftheMossad,Thoushaltmakewarbywayofdeception,(OstrovskyandHoy1991,1).ThefactthattheMossadabandonedthismottoafterotherstatesexpressedtheirdispleasurewithitprovesthepointthatMattox(2002)makes:statesmustbeconsciousofthemorallimitsofdeception.TheMossadsteppedbackfromtheiroverteffronteryintermsofwavingtheirno-limits-to-our-deceptioninthefaceoftheworld;butofcourseIsraeliintelligenceneverstoppedintermsofpractice,whichiswhynationsthatsupportamulti-polarworld,likeRussia,Syria,IranandChina,areoftenatoddswithIsraeliaims(Kent2019).Israel,liketheUS,isfocusedprimarilyonazerosumgamestrategy(Kent2019).Mattox(2002)atleastapproachestheissueofmorallimitstodeceptionfromapractical,universal,politicalanddiplomaticpositionthathasutilitarian,deontologicalandevenvirtueethicselementstoit.TheoppositepositionofCohen(2016)canonlybeacceptedfromanethicalegoismpointofview,andethicalegoismisthemostrelativeandleasteffectiveethicalposition,aspointedoutbyLyons(1976).Unfortunately,moralitywithintherealmofmoderncounterintelligenceisoftenthefirstcasualty,ashistoryshows(Valentine2016).TheofficialbeginningsofcounterintelligenceundertheleadershipofJamesJesusAngletonhaveillustratedtheextenttowhichtheartofdeceptioncancreateproblemswithintheintelligencecommunity(Morley2017,69).Withinthiscommunityitselfthereisnostandardethicalframeworkapplied,butthereshouldbe(BaileyandGalich2012,77).Tomakemattersworse,incounterintelligence,thereisevenlessemphasisonethicalcohesion,asValentine(2016),Unkefer(2013),andPfaffandTiel(2004)pointout.Iftherewereamoreunified,standardizedmoralframeworkappliedthroughoutcounterintelligence,itislikelythatitshistoryintheUSwouldbelessfraughtwithconflictsofinterest,humanfailings,ulteriormotives,problematicrelationships,andquestionabletactics.Thereasonsuchaframeworkhasnotbeenappliedisthatitisviewedasrestrictiveandinapplicableintheworldofcounterintelligence.IntheAmericanintelligencefield,thepositionlikethatofCohen(2016)hasprevailed.Thispositionisbadforcounterintelligencebecauseoftheproblemsthatarise.Valentine(2016)detailstheseproblemsverywellinhisworkonabuseswithintheCIA,FBNandFBI.Unkefers(2013)memoirofcounterintelligenceintheFBNsupportsValentinesclaimsandshowshowdangerousandcorruptingthelackofmorallimitsondeceptioncanbe.Theirworkprovidesamplesupportformorallimitationstodeception.Yet,thissupportisslowincomingbecauseopponentsofsuchaviewarguethatthesystemworksasis.Indeed,Unkefer(2013)admitsasmuch,reluctantlybuthedoesalsoraisethequestionofwhethertheendsjustifythemeans.Itisaquestionthatneedstobeaskedandthatgoesbacktotheissueofwhetherethicalegoismisasufficientmoralframeworkforcounterintelligence.Valentine(2016)makesthebestargumentforwhyitisnot:thedamagetoAmericanideals,Americasreputation,Americandiplomacyandpolitics,andAmericancultureistoogreat.Counterintelligencehasoftenbeenlinkedwiththeideaofnationalsecurity,yetasNolan(1997)showsitisdangeroustothinkofcounterintelligenceasasecurityexercisebecauseitisliterallynothingofthesort.Writingfromthestandpointofprivateindustry,Nolan(1997)statesexplicitlythatwhilesecurityseekstoprotectafirm\'sassetsbyacombinationofpolicies,proceduresandpractices,counterintelligence,properlyunderstood,aimstoengageandneutralizeacompetitor\'scollectioneffortsthroughavarietyofimaginative,flexible,andactivemeasures(53).Thepointofconcern,here,isnotonlythedegreetowhichthoseimaginative,flexible,andactivemeasuresleadtotheproblemsbothfortheagencyandforthefielditaimstoserve(Nolan1997,53).Thereisalsothematterofconfusingcounterintelligencewithsecurity,whichispreciselywhathashappenedinthepastandiscurrentlyhappeningundertheTrumpAdministrationwithits2020-2022NationalCounterintelligenceStrategy.Thefactthatcounterintelligencehasbeenconflatedwithsecurityispartoftheproblem:ithasledtoakindofself-deceptionwiththegovernment.Itisnosecretthatself-deceptionweakensonesabilitytoengageincounterintelligenceeffectively(Unkefer2013),andeventheancientartofwarpracticedbySunTzusuggestsasmuch.AmericanpolicyoncounterintelligencehasnotbeendevelopedwiththeimportantwarningfromNolan(1997)inmind.Instead,ithasbeenformulatedwithaviewtowardsremovingallmorallimitsandconstraintsoncounterintelligenceandrecommittingitselftothepursuitofvictoryinthezerosumgamepolicymakerswishtoseethenationplaying.DeceptivePolicyItishelpfultoconsiderhowself-deceptiveAmericanpolicyhasbecometoillustratetheimportantpointsthatNolan(1997),Mattox(2002)andValentine(2016)make.Forinstance,thestrategicobjectivesofthe2020-2022NationalCounterintelligenceStrategyoftheUnitedStates(2020)are:1)toprotectthenationscriticalinfrastructure,2)reducethreatstosupplychains,3)countertheexploitationoftheUSeconomy,4)defendAmericandemocracyagainstforeigninfluence,and5)counterforeignintelligencecyberandtechnicaloperations(4).Theseobjectivesdifferfromthe2018-2022NationalCounterintelligenceandSecurityCenterStrategicPlan.UnderDirectrWilliamR.Evanina,integrationofCIandsecurityactivitieswasatoppriorityandthemeofthe2018-2022strategy,butthestrategicgoalswerequitedistinct:Goal1wastoAdvanceourKnowledgeof,andourAbilitytoCounterForeignandotherThreatsandIncidents;Goal2wastoProtectUSCriticalInfrastructure,Technologies,Facilities,ClassifiedNetworks,SensitiveInformation,andPersonnel;Goal3wastoAdvanceourCounterintelligenceandSecurityMissionandOptimizeEnterpriseCapabilitiesthroughPartnerships;Goal4wastoStrengthenourEffectivenessthroughStakeholderEngagement,Governance,andAdvocacy;andGoal5wastoAchieveourMissionthroughOrganizationalExcellence(NationalCounterintelligenceandSecurityCenterStrategy2018-20202020,ii).Thedifferencerevealstheissueofmissioncreepthegradualblurringoflines,blurringofobjectives,expansionofmeanings,andtakinglibertieswithoriginalmandates.Itshouldbeconsidered,afterall,thattheofficialresponsibilityofcounterintelligenceistocollectinformationandconductactivitiestoidentify,deceive,exploit,disrupt,orprotectagainstespionage,otherintelligenceactivities,sabotage,orassassinationsconductedfororonbehalfofforeignpowers,organizations,orpersonsortheiragents,orinternationalterroristorganizations(NationalCounterintelligenceandSecurityCenterStrategy2018-20202020,2).Theconflated,mixed,broad,andsomewhatvaguestrategicobjectivesthathavebeendevelopedforthecounterintelligencecommunityintheyear2020reflectsthesameconflated,mixed,broad,andsomewhatvaguestrategicobjectivesthatplaguedtheCIcommunitysPhoenixprogram,whichValentine(2016)hascalledtheblueprintforallcurrentintelligenceaction(50).Tromblay(2017)hasconcurredwiththeassessmentthattheintelligencecommunityisoverstretchedandovertaxedandthatcounterintelligenceisbeingtaskedwithtoomanyobjectivesthatareforeigntoitsmission.TheissuesidentifiedbyTromblay(2017)arethattheU.S.governmenthasattemptedtopartnerwiththeprivatesectoroncounterintelligence(CI)awarenessandresponse,[butthat]theseeffortshavebeenplaguedbyalimitedconceptofwhichindustrysectorsareatrisk,inconsistencyinprograms,andredundanciesacrossagencies(1).Overall,thereisalackofreconciliationbetweenvisionandmissionandwhatisbeingaskedofCI.Itappearsthatpolicymakersareeitherunclearaboutthelimitationsofcounterintelligenceworkorarenotinterestedintheselimitationsandseekamoreexpansiveuseofcounterintelligence,i.e.,tousedeceptiontobolstersecurityagainstthewarningsofNolan(1997).Ineithercase,itisaneffortinself-deceptionthatwilllikelyonlyleadtomoreproblemsfortheCIcommunity.Tosummarizetheproblem,theareaofactionforcounterintelligencemaybeonethingintermsofamission,butthestrategicoperationsandintegrationofcounterintelligencewithsecurityandotherstate-sanctionedactionshasrefueledandthreatenstoperpetuatethesameproblemsthatledtotheChurchCommittees(1976)conclusionthattheCIAhadcreatedacounterintelligencemonster(172).WhileitisacknowledgedthattheCIcommunityshouldworkmorecloselywithprivateindustrytoengageeffectivelyinitsofficialmission(Nakashima2020),therealityofhowthiscollaborationistotakeplace,ethicallyandpractically,isaproblemthatremainstobeaddressed.TheriskofnotaddressingitputstheCIcommunityindangerofoperatingoutsideofitsscopeandengaginginthepreciseproblematicmisinterpretationofcounterintelligencewarnedagainstbyNolan(1997).Nolans(1997)warningisimportanttoconsider,butithasbeenlargelyignoredbecausetheframeworkofethicalegoismhasbeenadoptedfromthebeginningunderAngleton,whoworkedcloselywiththeMossadfromthestartofCIoperations(Morley2017).Morley(2017)doesanexcellentjobinidentifyingthecloserelationshipbetweenAngletonandTelAviv,arelationshipignoredbymostotherresearchers.UnderstandingthisrelationshipisimportantbecauseitrevealstheculturalinfluencethatIsraeliintelligencehadonAngleton.RatherthanrootingCIinthestrongmoralfoundationsoftheWest(virtueethics,deontologyorutilitarianism),AngletonadoptedtheethicalegoismframeworkoftheMossad,andthathasmadeallthedifference.TheRoleofEthicsOneoftheproblemsencounteredinstudyingcounterintelligenceishowtoapproachitfromanethicalpointofview(PfaffandTiel,2004).Defininganethicalframeworkisessentialinapproachingthesubject,yetproblematicatthesametimebecausecounterintelligencehasnotbeenapproachedinthesamewaybythosewhopracticedorcontinuetopracticeit.BaileyandGalich(2012)makeaveryeffectiveargumentforwhyamoretraditionalanddefinedethicalframeworkisneededinCI.PfaffandTiel(2004)explainthatcurrentlythereisalackofethicalfocusinCI,butBaileyandGalich(2012)gettotherootofthematter:noagenciesinCIappeartobeinterestedinsettingmorallimitationstothepracticeofCI.WhilevarioustheoreticalassumptionshavebeenappliedtocriticalstudiesoftheCIcommunityinthepast,noneofthesestudieshaveactuallygonesofarastorecommendanethicalframework.Erskine(2004)addressedtheutilitarianethicsofCI(360);PfaffandTiel(2004)arguedthateveryethicalapproachtoCIisrootedinLockeanordeontologicalethics(1-2);Mattox(2002)approachesthetopicfromthestandpointofvirtueethics,arguingthatifleadersdonotactingoodfaithevenwiththosewhoaretheiradversariesthepotentialriskofdamagedreputationscanunderminethediplomaticstrategiesofthestateandcreategreaterproblemsthanbefore(4).Eachofthesestudiesiseffectiveinillustratingtheshort-comingsofethicalapplicationinCI,butnoneofthempresentawayforwardorasolutiontotheproblem.Eachhighlightsapartoftheproblem,butnoneofthemproposesasufficientsolution.Theproblemisreal:tosupportthepointofMattox(2002),LieberthalandJisi(2012)explainthattheallianceamongChina,Russia,andIran(allconsideredcounterintelligencetargetsinthe2020-2022NationalCounterintelligenceStrategyoftheUnitedStates)hascomeaboutasadirectresponsetotheperceptionofthesestatesthattheUShasactedinbadfaithandcannotbetrusted.Whatisthesolution?Noneofthesestudiesbythemselvesprovidesaholisticsolutionbecausetheproblemultimatelyiscultural.Tounderstandthatpoint,onehastoconsiderthetraditionalpurposeofethicsintheWestandintheEastandhowthatpurposediffersfromthemodernapproachtoethicsfromthestandpointofegoism.Researchersconsistentlysuggestthatethicsmatterinallaspectsofstatehood,nolessincounterintelligencethaninanyothersphere(Bellaby2012;Erskine2004;BaileyandGalitch2012;PfaffandTiel2004).Because,however,therehasbeennostandardethicalframeworkusedincounterintelligence,aneedforconsistencyinapplicationofanethicalsystemtoCImustbeassumed.BaileyandGalitch(2012)makethispointmosteffectivelybyexplainingthecodeofethicsintheintelligencecommunityandidentifyingitsweaknessesandproblemareas.However,havingacodeandimplementingacodearetwodifferentthings,andthisiswhereculturecomesintoplay.TheMossadchangeditsmottotoappeasetheworld,butitdidnotchangeitstactics.Inshort,itswordschanged,butitsactionsstayedthesame:thesamecultureremained.ThecultureintheUSiswhatmustbeaddressed,asValentine(2016)deftlyshows.Withpowerasthemainimpetus,otherdriversofhumanaction,suchasvirtueethics,dutyethics,utilitarianism,andethicalegoism,maybeusedtoexplaintheproblemsthatarosewithinthecounterintelligenceprogramfromthe1950stothe1970s.Relevanttheoriesincludeconflicttheory,structuralfunctionalism,andcriticaltheory.Conflicttheorywaspositedasaresponsetostructuralfunctionalism,andcriticaltheoryaroseoutofthefailureofconflicttheorytofullyaccountforthefailureoftheMarxistprophecy(Horkheimer1972,246).Horkheimer(1972)fillsthegapinculturalstudiesleftbyotherresearcherswhofailedtodrawtheconnectionbetweenmedia,thestate,andtheculturalaimsoftheelite.ComingfromaJewishculturalbackgroundhimself,Horkheimer(1972)understoodtherolethattheeliteplayintheformationofcultureinthemodernUSanddescribesbetterthananyoneelseinthefieldhowtheethicsofthepeoplehavebeenformedbyanelitistgroupinpower.However,byitselfcriticaltheoryisaninadequatetheorybecausesocialactionismorethanaquestforliberation.Inotherwords,Horkheimer(1972)representsonlyonetypeofcultureanon-traditionalculturethatisneitherinlinewithtraditionalWesternorEasternvaluesbutratheronethathashaditsownvaluesandtraditionspredicatedonitsownspecialplaceinGodseyesandinrelationtotherestoftheworld.Equallyinadequatebyitselfisstructuralfunctionalism,becauseitdoesnotconsidertherolethatconflictplaysinsociety.Obviouslywithdifferentculturesandvaluesclashingatdifferentlevelsofsocietytherewillbeconflict.Withafocusonhowethicsplayapartindecision-making,structuralfunctionalism,conflicttheoryandcriticalthorycanhelptoexplainthecomplexcultureofCIinAmerica.Thereisnooneresearcherwhomakesthispoint,butvariousresearchershavemadevalidargumentsindefenseoftheirowntheoreticalpositions.FrameworkforAnalyzingthePastBecauseoftheconfusionregardingculture,culturalvalues,andethics,thereisnoconsensusonhowtoanalyzethepast,asPfaffandTiel(2004)show.Nonetheless,thereisaneedforaframeworkforanalyzingthepast,becauseonlywithsuchaframeworkcanonebegintounderstandthemistakesandthelessonsthatcanbelearnedfromthepast.Todecideonthatframework,onehastodecideonwhatvaluesaremostimportantbutthisisthecruxofthematter.Beforeonecanrightlyconsidertherolethatethicsshouldplayinthefieldofcounterintelligence,onemustdecideontheculturalperspectivefromwhichtojudge.Morley(2013)illustrateshowAngletonwasinfluencedbyIsraelscultureofstatecraft.Thoughhedoesnotemphasizethepoint,itisnecessarytodoso.ThatinfluenceiswhatisattheheartofAmericaslackofmoralrestraintincounterintelligence.Thelackofmoralrestrainthasbeenwelldocumented(Valentine2016).TheculturalinfluenceresponsibleforthatlackhasnotreceivedmuchfocusfromresearcherslikeValentine(2016),Morley(2013)orPfaffandTiel(2004).Whethertheyhaveintentionallyturnedablindeyetoitorhavesimplypassedovertheinfluenceofcultureonthematterisunknown.Whatisknownisthat,asBellaby(2012)states,counterintelligenceisanyactionoractivitythatisknowinglydesignedandintendedtoencourageanaudienceofsomesorttobelieveinsomethingwhichisuntrue(147).Traffickinginuntruthscanbehighlyriskyifnotapproachedwithafirmethicalframeworkinplace.Forexample,whatareacceptablecounterintelligenceactionsandwhatunacceptablecounterintelligenceactions?Mattox(2002)assertsthatthereshouldbemorallimitsonCI,butdoesnotgointoconsiderabledetailtoexplicitlystatewhatthoselimitsshouldbe.Again,theissueofdelineationisavoidedbecauseitisanissueofcultureatroot,andculturalconflictsexistthroughoutAmericansocietyfromtoptobottom.Erskine(2004)providesaninitialsteptowardsthinkingaboutCIfromamoretraditionalethicalperspective,onethatisrealistic,consequentialistanddeontologicalbut,again,thesameproblemsemerge.Dutyisrelativetoonesculturalimperativeandonesperceivedobjective.Erskine(2004)isnotunrealisticeitherinappreciatingtheambiguousmoralnatureofCIashestatesthatnotonlyisdeceptionintrinsictoclandestinecollection,butitisalsocentraltocounter-intelligenceactivitiessuchasthedeploymentofdoubleagentsandthesendingoffalsemessageswhenitiswewhowouldratherkeepoursecretstoourselves(372).Erskines(2004)approachtowardssuggestinganethicalframeworkforexaminingthepastishelpful,butitdoesnotprovideanyconclusiveanswers.Moretothepoint,intermsofthedangerposedbyanunethicalapproachtocounterintelligence,isBellabys(2012)assessmentoftheunderlyingreasonforthefailurewithinthecounterintelligenceprograminthepast:theapplicationofwidespreaddeceptionrepresentsadangerforonesownnationbecauselyingcandamagesocietyasitchipsawayat,andcoulddestroythesocialbondsoftrustandasaresultbreaksdownthemoralandsocialrelationshipsthatholdasocietytogether(149).ThisdangerishighlightedbyValentine(2016)whocitesthePhoenixProgram,initiatedinVietnamasatemplateforcorruptionwithintheintelligencecommunityandonethatisstillpromotedtothisday(40).Afurtherproblem,identifiedbyBaileyandGalich(2012)isthattherehasneverbeenastandardizedethicalframeworkusedwithinthecounterintelligenceprogramandthat,justasfreedomofreligioncanquicklyleadtofreedomfromreligion,freedomofchoicewithregardstoethicscanquicklyleadtofreedomfromethics.Thosewhoanalyzethepasttendtodosowithoutcommittingthemselvestoanethicalperspective.Cohen(2016)isaloneamongresearchersinthathisperspectiveisobviousevenifnotexplicit:hisiselitistandethicalegoismistheframework.Otherresearchers,fromErskine(2004)toBaileyandGalich(2012)avoidmakinganyexplicitstatementsonethicalegoism.Itisalmostasthoughtheyaretryingtoavoidaconfrontation.TocalloutthepurveyorsofethicalegoisminpolicymakingintheCIcommunitywouldbeakintothrowingdownagauntletandinvitingblowback.Realizingthatiswhyitisimportanttokeepconflicttheoryinmindwhenaddressingthesepoints.Theethicalframeworkusedtoanalyzethepastmustberealistic,however,asErskine(2004)argues.ThatisoneofthebestpointsthatErskine(2004)makes.CIisbynaturemorallyambiguous.Thefactisthatdeceptionispartofthetradeincounterintelligence:intelligenceprofessionalsaroundtheworldaretaughtandencouragedbytheirleadersandagenciestouseunethicaltacticsortradecraft(e.g.lie,deceive,steal,andmanipulate)inordertoobtain[crucial]information(Coyneetal.2013,27).Thereisnowaytoavoidthisfactandnegotiatingwithitfromanethicalstandpointputsorremoveslimitationsonhumanbehavior.Thoselimitations,moreover,canbethedifferencebetweenasuccessfulcounterintelligenceoperationandafailedoperation(Unkefer2013).ThisrealitymaybewhyresearcherslikeBaileyandGalich(2012)andErskine(2004)havebeenreluctanttoprovideanethicalframeworkfortheCIcommunity.Regardless,theirstudiesindicatetheneedforone.Toprovetheneedforsuchaframework,itishelpfultodrawuponValentines(2016)work,whichisfactualratherthantheoreticalliketheworkofErskine(2004)andMattox(2002).ValentinesstudyoftheCIAfromitsinceptionisuniqueamongotherresearchers,ashewasgivenspecialaccesstoCIAagentsbyDirectorColby,andmuchoftheinformationgivenhimbyagentswasconsideredsafeastheagentsassumedValentinewasintheCIAandwasnotgoingtopublishwhatwasbeingtoldtohim.ValentinesreportingprovidesauniquebutpersonallookintothehistoryofintelligenceintheUS.Itdiffersfromotherstudies,suchasthatofBellaby(2012)andPfaffandTiel(2004),whicharescholarly-orientedratherthanhistorically-oriented.Valentinesworkservesasanhistoricalrecordoferrors,mistakesandproblemswithintheintelligenceandcounterintelligenceenterpriseresultingfromalackofethicalimperatives.PfaffandTiel(2004)indicatethatessentiallytheyallcombineaspectsofdeontologyandLockeanethics,inthatthepracticeofdeceptionisperceivedasadutytothestate,onethatmustbepracticedinordertosafeguardthestatesownsecretsandtopreventforeignactorsfromacquiringtruthfulinformationthatmightcompromiseamissioninthefield.Yet,deontologyandLockeanethicshavenotsafeguardedtheintelligencecommunityfromerrorsandabuses(PfaffandTiel,2004;Valentine,2016).TheNeedforCollaborationandClarityNotonlyhasaneedbeenidentifiedforcollaborationbetweentheCIcommunityandprivateindustry,butthereisarecognizedneedthattheglobalizedworldhaschangedthewayinwhichnationsmustinteract:morecollaborationandlessintrigueisrequired.Forexample,GodsonandWirtz(2000)statethatthebreakdownofthetraditionalbarrierstonationalsovereigntyincreasestheinformationandeconomicchannelsthatinternationalplayersmustnavigate,fosterandmaintain(432).GodsonandWirtz(2000)furtherpointoutthatforeigndenialanddeceptionaffectsthequalityoflifeintheUnitedStatesbycausingpolicymakerstowastescarcepublicresourcesandtofailtoanticipatestrategicthreats(435).Thispointraisesthequestionofwhetherdeceptionshouldhaveanypartinstatecraftperiod.Kent(2019)explainsthattoboastofopenlydeceivingbyengagingincounterintelligenceistoputonesownnationalreputationatrisk:thatisonereasontheIsraeliMossadchangeditsmotto,whichusedtostate,Bywayofdeception,thoushaltconductwar(86).Nationsthusopenlyadmitthatengagingindeceptionisabadlook.BothKent(2019)andGodsonandWirtz(2000)helptomaketheproblemofmoralityinCIevenmorecomplicatedbyaskingifdeceptionshouldhaveanypartinpolicy.TheyrepresentonesideoftheethicalspectrumandCohen(2016)representstheotherside.Kent(2019)andGodsonandWirtz(2000)representtheabsolutistsideofthediscussion;Cohen(2016)representstherelativisticside.Theabsolutistsideofthediscussionhasamuchbetterargumentthantherelativisticside.Thereasonforthisisthatthereisanescalationprobleminvolved,fromapracticalstandpoint.AsBernardi(2013)states,Usually,informationcontrolgeneratesanescalationofcounterintelligencemeasures,becauseinformationcontrolonthepartofoneStateinvitesothergovernmentsandagenciestocounteract,bymeansofcountermeasuresagainstespionageanddeception(50).Whenonenationdeceives,anotherwillfollow.Angletonfacedtheproblemofescalationhisentirecareer(Morley2013).ThisiswhytheabsolutistpositionofKent(2019)makessense,practicallyspeaking.Itmaybebettersimplytofocusoncollaborationandclaritythanonattemptingtodeceive.Ironically,itisinthiscontextthattheIntelligenceandNationalSecurityAlliance(2020)hasidentfiedaneedtoclarifytheroleofCIintheeraofglobalization(1).Yetthecultureofdeceptionhasspreadallovertheglobe.Developers,technicians,productionpersonnel,ITpersonnel,businessdevelopmentpersonnel,humanresourcespersonnel,andfacilitypersonnelareallpotentialtargetsofforeignactorsandforeigncollectorsofintelligence(NationalCounterintelligenceandSecurityCentern.d.).Privateindustryisatriskbecauseitpossessesintellectualpropertythatforeignactorscovetandbusinessactivitiescanbeexploited.Cyberoperationsarealsoatrisk,asisconfidentialinformation,whichcanbemishandledbyemployees.Counterintelligenceoperationscouldbeusedtodeliberatelyleakfalseinformationtoknownforeignactors,butdoingsorunstheriskofescalatingalargerconflictamongnations,asBernardi(2013)notes.Bernardi(2013),liketheothers,highlightstheproblembutdoesnotpointtoasolution.Fromanethicalstandpointitisdifficulttodeterminewherethelineshouldbeintermsofusingdeception.Thus,onemuststepbacktothestandpointofcultureandperhapseventoabsolutisminordertoestablishtheconditionsnecessaryforcollaborationandclarity,asKent(2019)proposes.SummationSincecounterintelligencecametomaturityintheUSinaneraofconflict,itishelpfultoapproachthesubjectfromthestandpointofconflicttheoryandthetheoriesdevelopedaroundit,allofwhichfocusonthewaysinwhichpowerissoughtandusedbygroupsinordertoobtainormaintainpossessionofvitalresourcesormaintainabalanceofrelationshipsthatensurestabilityandorderinasystem.Thisapproachallowstheresearchtoexplorethewaysinwhichpowerdrovetheinitiativesofcounterintelligencepoliciesduringthe50s,60sand70s.However,theliteratureshowsthattheproblemofethicsincounterintelligencehashadnoeasysolutionandthattheartofdeceptionissuchthatitfostersagrayzoneofdisinformation,conflictsofinterestandcorruption.Theoutcomeofthissituationwasthatcounterintelligencesufferedfromapoorcultureandvariousotherissues,resultingultimatelyinthedismissalofAngletonandanattempttorestarttheprogram.Astheprogramnowtriestoaddresstheissuesofthe21stcentury,itappearsthatguidancecouldbeusedtohelpsteerthecounterintelligenceprogramawayfromthesameerrorsandpoliciesthatderaileditinthepast.Theliteraturesuggeststhataneedexistsforthisproblemtobeaddressed,andtohelprespondtothatneedatheoreticalapproachtotheproblemshouldbedefined.MethodologyThereisnostandardethicalframeworkincounterintelligence,whichpresentsaproblembecauseoftheriskofsubjectiveorquestionablemoralityseepingintocounterintelligenceactivities(Valentine2016).Tounderstandtheproblem,thisresearchdesignisqualitativebecausethesubjectisexploratoryinnature.TheaimoftheresearchistoexplorebywayofcomparativecasestudyanalysisthecounterintelligenceprogramunderJamesJesusAngleton,CIinthePhoenixProgramandtheFBIsCOINTELPRO,andCIintheFBN.Scholarlyarticles,monographs,Senatereports,memoirs,independentresearch,biographies,andanalysiswillserveasthesourcesofinformation.Datawasanalyzedusingcontentanalysis,withthemesdrawnfromtheliteratureandarrangedandorganizedtogiveaclearerunderstandingofhowethicsmightbebetterutilizedtoguidetheintegrationofthecounterintelligenceenterprisewiththeprivatesectorinthe21stcentury.Conceptsofethicswereoperationalizedbydefiningtheminaccordancewithacceptedscholarlypractices.Potentialbiaseswereaddressedbybracketingthemoutatthebeginning,asrecommendedbyJohnston,Wallis,Oprescu,andGray(2017).Thecasestudyanalysisfocusesonthreeareasinparticular,1)theuseofcounterintelligenceintheCIAundercounterintelligenceChiefJamesJesusAngleton;2)theuseofcounterintelligenceinthePhoenixProgramandtheFBIsCOINTELPRO,and3)theuseofcounterintelligencebytheFederalBureauofNarcotics(FBN).Researchmethodsforobtainingdataareimportantbecausetheydeterminethekindofdatathatiscollected.Forinstance,asurveycansupplyquantitativedatausinga5pointLikertscalethatallowstheresearchtostatisticallyanalyzetheresultsandtestforcorrelationordescribetheaveragesandsoon.Afocusgroupmethodcanallowaresearchertoobtainqualitativedatathatfocusesoncommonthemesandconceptsfoundamongtheresponsesofthevariousparticipantsinthefocusgroupwhenaquestionisputoutforgroupdiscussion.Experimentsallowaresearchertotestahypothesisandlookatspecificvariablesandhowtheyrelate.Interviewsallowaresearchertoobtainin-depthdatafromasingleparticipantbyaskingquestionsthatcanleadtomorequestionsandmoreanswersandsoon.Eachmethodishelpfuldependingonwhattheresearcherisattemptingtodo,andsotheyallhavetheirplaceinmeaningfulresearch(Walliman2017).Thedifferencebetweenquantitativeandqualitativeresearchisthattheformeristypicallyconductedtotestahypothesiswhereasthelatteristypicallyconductedtodevelopahypothesis.Thisstudyisexploratoryandisthereforenotaimingtotestahypothesisbutrathertocomparefindingsfromthreedifferentcaseexamplesofcounterintelligenceactivities.Thecomparativecasestudyapproachreliesheavilyuponsecondarydataanalysisi.e.,datathathasalreadybeencompiled.Forthisstudy,threeworksinparticularwillserveasthestartingpoint:Unkefers(2013)memoirofworkingwiththeFBN,90Church;Morleys(2017)biographyofAngleton,TheGhost:TheSecretLifeofCIASpymasterJamesJesusAngleton;andValentines(2016)collectionofresearchonthePhoenixProgramaswellastheFBN.Analysisoftheseworkswillthenbefollowedupandcomplementedbyanalysisofrelevantarchivaldata,gatheredbyusingsnowballsamplingi.e.,reviewingsourcesidentifiedintheoriginaldataandusingthosesourcestogatheradditionalsourcesandsoon.Secondarydataanalysisistypicallyusedinliteraturereviewsandsystematicreviewstoprovideafoundationforfurtherresearchortocompilepastinformationfromdecadesofpreviousresearchintooneresearcharticle,anditcanbeofequalimportanceincasestudyanalysis(Walliman2017).Itcanbeusedforeitherqualitativeorquantitativeresearch,andthedatacanbeinterpretedintermsofqualityandcharacteristicsofthearchivaldataorintermsofstatistics.Itcanalsobeusedbyresearcherswhodonothavetimetoconductanexperimentorfieldworkontheirownsotheyusedatafrompreviouslyconductedstudiesandincorporateitintotheirownstudy.Forthepurposesofthisstudy,secondarydatawillbecompiledthematicallywithaviewtowardsevaluatingcounterintelligencecaseexamplesfromthestandpointofethicsandoutcomestodeterminehowethicsmightbestbeappliedtobolstercounterintelligenceforthefuture.Theethicalperspectivesfromwhichthesecounterintelligencecaseswillbeassessedwillbe1)virtueethics,2)dutyethics,3)utilitarianism,and4)ethicalegoism.Thesearethefourmainrelevantethicalsystemstypicallyutilizedinethicsdiscoursetodiscussactionsandtheirmoralityintodaysworld(PojmanandFeiser2012).AsPojmanandFieser(2012)note,moralprinciplesconcernstandardsofbehavior;roughlyspeaking,theyinvolvenotwhatisbutwhatoughttobe(3).Thegoalofthisstudyistoidentifywhattheethicalframeworkoughttobeforthecounterintelligencecommunitygoingforward.Thismethodisconductedbycreatingasetofparametersforthesearchingofadatabase.Thesearchwillhavetohaveinclusionandexclusionparameterssoastodeterminewhatdatawillbeincludedinthestudyandwhatdatawillbeexcludedandthisshouldbeexplainedinthewrite-up.Thedataisthenobtainedfromthedatabaseandanalyzedaccordingly.Theadvantagesofsecondarydataanalysisandarchivalstudiesarethatitisagoodwaytoreviewwhatinformationisavailableineitherpublishedorunpublishedform(Walliman2017).Itallowsdatatobeaggregatedtoonesourceandexaminedandthatinformationpresentedforothersinasystematicoratleastlogicalandorderlyway.Thelimitationsofthismethodarethatitisnotgenerallygoingtoprovideanynewinsightonasubjectoradvancearesearchissue.Itisgenerallyusedforbuildingacaseforfutureresearchortoshowwherethefocusinthepasthasbeenorwhystudiesonasubjectsofarhavebeeninadequate(Walliman2017).Sincetheaimofthisstudyisexploratoryinnatureandintendstofocustheissueoftheapplicationofethicsincounterintelligence,thislimitationisnotseenasnegative.Purposivesamplingwillalsobeusedinconjunctionwithsnowballsamplingtoobtaindata.Purposivesamplingisacceptableforqualitativeresearchbecauseinqualitativeresearchoneisexploringaproblemratherthanattemptingtotestahypothesis(Marshall1996).Qualitativeresearchisaboutcollectingdatasoastoformulateahypothesis,whereasquantitativeresearchisaboutalreadyhavingahypothesisandobtainingarandomsamplethatisrepresentativeofthepopulationandtestingthathypothesiswiththesample.Generally,inquantitativestudies,theresearcherwantstohavearandomizedsampleandifthetestisexperimentalacontrolledtrialmightbeconducted.Hwever,purposivesamplingcanbeuseddependingonwhattheaimofthestudyis:ifthestudyislookingatanarrowerpopulation,suchashowparticularintelligenceagentsappliedasystemofethicsintheircounterintelligencework,purposivesamplingwithinaparticularagencywouldmakesenseevenifthestudyisquantitative(Walliman2017).Thus,thereisnoonesizefitsallmodelforwhatkindofsamplingprocessshouldbeconducted:italldependsonthedesignofthestudyandthedatacollectionmethodologybeingused(LangandAltman2016).Inaqualitativestudy,onemightconductafocusgrouporintervieworcasestudy,allofwhichwilllikelyuseapurposivesamplingapproachbecauseitgivestheresearcherabetterfocusonpeoplewhorepresentthepopulationandachancetounderstandinmoredetailwhatthispopulationislikebasedoninterviewswithpeoplefromthatpopulation.Thenthatdatacanbetakentodevelopahypothesis,whichcanthenbetestedquantitativelywith,forinstance,asurveyofthewiderpopulationusingarandomsampleapproachtotestforstatisticalsignificanceofthenullhypothesis(Marshall1996).Thequalitativeresearchergainsmoredirectinsightintoaspecificpopulationthroughpurposivesampling.Whatisgivenupbynotusingrandomsamplingisaccesstoawiderpopulation.Thetrade-offisworthitthoughbecauseinordertounderstandonegroup,itrequiresnarrowup-closeexaminationandexploration(Walliman2017).Ifthefieldisopenedupatrandom,theresearcherwillnothavethesameopportunitytostudyupcloseasinglegrouporpopulation,butmayhaveoneparticipantfromthisgroupandanotherfromthatgroup,whichmakesthedatalessreliableandcanimpairthevalidityofthefindingsbecausetheapproachisnotfocused.Purposivesamplingcanworkwellwithquantitativeresearchers,dependingonthenatureofthestudy,butingeneralquantitativeresearchwillfocusontestingahypothesiswiththewiderpopulationandusingarandomizedsamplefromapopulationinsteadoftheirownjudgment(Palinkasetal.2015).Thekeytoquantitativeresearchistobeasobjectiveaspossibleandtoremoveasmuchsubjectivebiasaspossible,whereasinqualitativeresearchitisacceptedthattheresearcherisgoingtobepersonallyinvolvedinmakingjudgmentsandthattheworkwillhaveahigherdegreeofsubjectivity.Thisdoespresentalimitationintermsofrandomization.However,thecharacteristicsofthestudyaresuchthatrandomizationwithregardtodatacollectionisnotofprimaryimportance,sincenotheoryorhypothesisisbeingtested.Circumstancesunderwhichaqualitativeresearchermightdecidetouserandomsamplinginsteadofpurposesamplingmightbeoneinwhichtheresearcheralreadyhasahypothesisformedandwantstoexplorewhetherthehypothesiscanbesignificantlyappliedamongthegeneralwiderpopulation.Sointhatcasetheresearchermightconductrandomsamplingtoobtainasmallpoolofparticipantsforafocusgrouporforinterviewsorforquestionnaires.Thishappenswhencompanieswanttotestanewproduct:theymayrandomlyselectparticipantsfromaspecificpopulationforafocusgroup;buttheywilllikelybeconductingamixed-methodsapproachandcollectingbothqualitativeandquantitativedata(WisdomandCreswell2013).Randomsamplingcanbeusedwhentheresearcheriswantingtocreateareliableandvaliddatasetandmaybeinterestedintriangulationofsources(CreswellandCreswell2018).Inconclusion,thisresearchstudyusesthecomparativecasestudyanalysisapproach.ThepurposeofthismethodistoexplorebywayofcomparativecasestudyanalysisthecounterintelligenceprogramunderJamesJesusAngleton,includingtheliteratureofthepastandpresent.Thegoaloftheresearchistoidentifywhattheethicalframeworkoughttobeforthecounterintelligencecommunitygoingforward.Thedatawillbeanalyzedusingcontentanalysisandorganizedthematically.Theframeworkbywhichthedatawillbeanalyzedwillbetheethicalframeworksofvirtueethics,dutyethics,utilitarianism,andethicalegoism.Samplingmethodswillbepurposiveandsnowball.FindingsAngletonsCIProgramAngletonheadedtheCIAscounterintelligenceprogramfortwodecades.Createdin1954,theCIprogramwashighlyinfluencedfromthebeginningbyAngleton(Morley2017).By1974,whenAngletonwasrelievedofhisdutiesbyCIAChiefWilliamColby,theAgencywasunderfireforhavingbeencaughtspyingonAmericancitizens,aclearviolationofitscharter(Morley2018).AngletonhadgonefarbeyondhismandateintheviewofClevelandCram,thesenioroperationsofficertaskedbyColbywithreviewingtheCIprogramunderAngletonstwentyyeartenure.Cramproduceda12-volumereport,eachvolumerunninghundredsofpageslong,detailingtheabusesthatoccurredunderAngletonswatch.ThereportwasclassifiedconfidentialbytheCIAandnevermadepublic;however,someoftheprimarysourcesusedbyCramtoassistinthewritingofthereportweremadeavailabletoMorley,abiographerofAngleton.ThesourceswereobtainedfromGeorgetownUniversitysBoothFamilyCenterforSpecialCollections(Morley2018).Thoughtherearemanyfocalpointsthatcouldbeexamined,includingtherolethatAngletonplayedinhandlingOswaldsfileinthelead-uptoandtheaftermathoftheJFKassassination,Morley(2018)focusedononesituationinparticular,emblematicoftheprobleminherentinAngletonsCIprogram:whattodowithtwoKGBdefectorswhosestoriescontradictedoneanotherinthe1960s.AngletonwasconcernedwithSovietdisinformation;BritishalliesinCIwereconcernedwithSovietpenetrationandcitedthetreacheryofSirAnthonyBlunt,theWesternintelligenceoperativewhodefectedtotheSovietUnionandservedasaprimeexampleoftheextenttowhichtheCIAhadbeenpenetrated.Theso-calledRingofFive,whichincludedKimPhilby,GuyBurgess,DonMaclean,JohnCairncrossandBlunt,wereallexposedastraitorstotheCrown(Cram1993,5).TheBritishthusplacedmuchmoreemphasisonpenetration;AngletonlesssountilGolitsynarrivedandinsistedthattheSovietshadpenetratedtheCIAatthehighestlevels(CentralIntelligenceAgency2011,39).FromthebeginningofhisworkattheheadofCI,AngletonhadacloseworkingrelationshipwiththeMossadandtraveledmonthlytoTelAviv;thisrelationshipbeganevenbeforetheCIprogramhadbeencreated,infactwhenAngletonwasCIAchiefofforeignintelligence(Morley2017,74).AnintimaterelationshipbetweenthetwointelligenceagenciesexistedthroughoutthedurationofAngletonstenure.AngletonsblindnesstotheriskofworkingcloselywiththeMossadwouldlaterleadtohiscritics,includingClareE.Petty,assertingthathewaseitheragiantfraudora[double]agent(Cram1993,8).Inthegameofusingdeceptiontoconfuseadversaries,theUSunderAngletonwasplayedbadly,andnoeventindicatedthismorethantheGolitsynvs.Nosenkodebacleofthe1960s(Morley2017).GolitsyndefectedfromtheSovietUnionin1961;Nosenkofollowedin1964.AngletonwaspartialtotheclaimsofGolitsynanddisbelievedNosenko,whilecriticsofAngletondismissedGolitsynandclungtoNosenkoasthesourceoftrueinformation.Golitsynenjoyedrelativefreedomandattention;NosenkounderwentimprisonmentandisolationforfouryearsuntilhisreleaseandsettlementinaWashingtonsuburb.GolitsynclaimedthattheKGBhadinfiltratedtheCIAandthatSovietdeceptionagainstWesternallieswasbeingusedtobringCommunismtotheWest(CentralIntelligenceAgency2011,40).WithGolitsyn,AngletondevelopedtheMasterPlanthesisthatdescribedthisideamorefully;criticslaterreferredtothisthesisastheMonsterPlotoutofdisgustforitsdetrimentaleffectsontheCIcommunity(CentralIntelligenceAgency2011,39-40).ConsistentwiththeMasterPlanthesis,GolitsynaccusedNosenkoofdefectingsoastoprovidecoverforaSovietmoleintheCIA(Morley2018).AngletonbelievedNosenko,notGolitsyn,tobeadouble-agent.Angletonscriticsarguedthatthetruthwasjusttheopposite.Nosenkosreleasein1968andsubsequentquietlifefreeofscandalappearedtohavevalidatedAngletonscritics.TheeffectofthisconfusionintheCIprogramunderAngletonwasatotalbreakdownoftrustwithintheCIcommunity(Cram1993).Agentwassetagainstagent,analystagainstanalystunderAngleton.AsMorley(2018)notes,AngletonandReuvenShiloah,founderofIsraelsInstituteforIntelligenceandSpecialTasks,betterknownastheMossad,hadaspecialrelationship.AngletonidentifieddeeplywithIsrael,andsucceedingMossadChiefMeirAmitviewedAngletonsidentificationwithIsrael[as]agreatassetforIsrael(Morley2018).TherelationshipwassopronouncedthatMorley(2018)hasreferredtoAngletonasanIsraelirecruit.ItwastoAngletonthatAmosManor,chiefofIsraelsShinBet,passedKhrushchevssecretspeechin1956.ThedocumentmadeAngletonastarintheintelligencecommunityandsolidifiedtherelationshipbetweenIsraelandAngleton(Morley2018).AngletonsbeliefinthemolethesisproposedbyGolitsynwasinpartbasedonhisownexperiencewithmoles.HehadbeenbestfriendswiththeBritishdiplomatKimPhilby,whodefectedtotheKGBinthe1950s.Angletonspre-conceivednotionsledhimtobelieveGolitsynforemost.AgentJohnHart,whowroteTheMonsterPlan,oneofthesourcesusedyCramandpassedontoMorley,statedcondemninglythatAngletonshandlingoftheaffairdidnotconformtoanygenerallyacceptedsenseofthetermmethodologyandthatanimprovementofintellectualstandardsintheCIprogramwasneeded(Morley2018).Whatwentunsaidwasanymentionofanimprovementintheagencysethicalstandards.AstandardethicalframeworkhadnotbeenestablishedunderAngletonandhasnottothisday.Instead,Angletonfocusedondevelopinganetworkoftenuousrelationships,manyofwhichprovedtobefalse.ThefinalviewofAngletonsCIprogramcanbesummedupappropriatelybyRavivandMelman(1990):AdmirationfortheJewishstatebecameanobsessionwithAngleton,whofellcaptivetothemagicofIsraeliintelligence(90).ThissuggeststhatratherthanputCIattheserviceoftheUS,AngletonplacedhimselfattheserviceofIsraelsMossad.TheextenttowhichtheMossadusedAngletoncanbeseenattheveryleastinthedevelopmentofIsraelsnucleararsenal,whichoccurredunderAngletonswatch.Angleton,whohadworkedrelativelycloselywiththeFBI,failedtofacilitatetheFBIsinvestigationintotheNuclearMaterialsandEquipmentCorporation,fromwhichnuclearmaterialwasdivertedillegallytoIsrael(Morley2018).Inshort,Angletonwascompromisedbyaconflictofinterestthatsawhisloyaltytoonestateoverridehisdutiestoanother.Inothercounterintelligenceoperations,loyaltytoagrouportoanideahasledtosimilaroutcomes.ThePhoenixProgramandtheFBIsCOINTELPROareexamplesthis.ThePhoenixProgramandtheFBIsCOINTELPROThoughproponentsofthePhoenixProgramhavehaileditaswildlysuccessful,conflictsofinterestplaguedtheProgramfromthestart,accordingtomembersoftheIntelligencecommunity,includingCaptainSidneyTowle,whosawtheeffectsoftheProgramfirsthandandwitnessedhowagentswouldabusetheirauthorityoutofpersonalspiteforadversaries(Valentine2014).Amixtureofcounterintelligenceandcounterinsurgency,thePhoenixProgramwasavastgrayareaofapplicationthatconsistedofidentifyingsuspectedadversariesandremovingthem.Theadversaryinthiscasewas,ostensibly,theVietCongInfrastructure(VCI).TheblurringoflinesbetweencounterintelligenceandcounterinsurgencyhelpedtopushCIinanewdirectionthatistodaycommonlyacceptedbythestateapparatus,thoughdeploredbyindividualslikeNolan(1997).TheProgramwasdescribedbyDrosnin(1975)astheonlysystematizedkidnapping,tortureandassassinationprogrameversponsoredbytheUnitedStatesgovernment.AbusesrangedfrommurderofsuspectedVCtosuspectsbeingnamed,torturedandkilledsimplyasaresultofpersonalanimosityorlocalquarrelamongindividualswhowantedtoactonagrudgeandthusmadefalseaccusations,knowingthattheaccusedwouldeffectivelybeeliminated(Valentine2016).AtopsecretreportpublishedbyVietnamVeteransAgainsttheWarshowedthatPhoenixwaspartofabroadercampaignintheCIcommunitytoexpandtheoperationsofCIdrastically,usingPSYOPStoreinforceCIobjectives.FormerCaptainintheUSArmyDavidCurry,formerNavalIntelligenceofficerJoeMiller,formerAirForceIntelligenceofficerPatMcCann,formerArmySecurityAgencyofficerBillBranson,andformerFirstLt.USArmyBarryRomo(1990)alltestifiedtothepersonallyandpoliticallydestructiveforcesthatsuchacampaignentailed.UnderOperationsPlanJERICHO,setinthePhilippinesinthe1980s,aPhoenix-styleprogramwasapprovedbytheArmyChiefsofStaff:OperationsPlanJERICHOisthemandateforaprogramofcommunitycounter-intelligence(COINTELPRO)andpsychologicaloperations(PSYOPS)thatCurryetal.believedwouldbemorallycorruptingfortheprotagonists(Curryetal.1990,20.).LikethePhoenixProgram,itblurredthelinesbetweenCI,PSYOPS,counterinsurgency,andgovernment-sponsoredterror.Bytheendofthe20thcentury,CIwasnolongersimplyaboutdisseminatingfalseinformationtoconfuseormisleadtheadversary:itwasnowpartofabroaderstrategytoattackandunderminetheadversaryscultureandsocialorganization.ThisstrategydidnotoriginatewithPhoenix.Itwasevident,aswell,intheFBIsCOINTELPRO,whichbeganin1956.Itisstillevidenttodayinthe2020-2022NationalCounterintelligenceStrategyoftheUnitedStates,whichusesthegoalofnationalsecurityasthecatch-allforsteeringCIfurtherintotherealmofpsychologicalwarfare,counterinsurgency,anddefensivecovertoperations.TheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities(1976)foundthatofficialsoftheintelligenceagenciesoccasionallyrecognizedthatcertainactivitieswereillegal,butexpressedconcernonlyforflappotential.Evenmoredisturbingwasthefrequenttestimonythatthelaw,andtheConstitutionweresimplyignored(13).AgentsinCI,whetheractinginthePhoenixProgramorintheFBIsCOINTELPRO,believedthemselvesandtheirconducttobeabovethelawandoutsidethepurviewofnormalethicalguidelinesbysheervirtueofthefactthattheywereengagedinwhatwastermedcounterintelligence.ThepervasiveattitudewasthatbeinginCIgavethemcarteblanchetodowhatevertheysawfitinordertodestroytheadversary.Fromthebeginning,theCIcommunityhadleaptfromengagingindeceptiontoseekingthedestructionoftheadversary.TheFBIsCOINTELPROwasinitiatedwithasimilarobjectivetothatofthePhoenixProgram,thegoalbeingtoinfiltrateAmericanorganizationsliketheBlackPanthersandtheKKK,assumepositionsofleadershipwithintheseorganizations,andco-opthem.COINTELPROtacticsincluded:Anonymouslyattackingthepoliticalbeliefsoftargetsinordertoinducetheiremployerstofirethem;Anonymouslymailingletterstothespousesofintelligencetargetsforthepurposeofdestroyingtheirmarriages;ObtainingfromIRSthetaxreturnsofatargetandthenattemptingtoprovokeanIRSinvestigationfortheexpresspurposeofdeterringaprotestleaderfromattendingtheDemocraticNationalConvention;FalselyandanonymouslylabelingasGovernmentinformantsmembersofgroupsknowntobeviolent,therebyexposingthefalselylabeledmembertoexpulsionorphysicalattack;Pursuanttoinstructionstousemisinformationtodisruptdemonstrations,employingsuchmeansasbroadcastingfakeordersonthesamecitizensbandradiofrequencyusedbydemonstrationmarshalstoattempttocontroldemonstrationsandduplicatingandfalselyfillingoutformssolicitinghousingforpersonscomingtoademonstration,therebycausinglonganduselessjourneystolocatetheseaddresses;SendingananonymouslettertotheleaderofaChicagostreetgang(describedasviolence-prone)statingthattheBlackPanthersweresupposedtohaveahitoutforyou.Theletterwassuggestedbecauseitmayintensify...animosityandcausethestreetgangleadertotakeretaliatoryaction;Fromlate1963untilhisdeathin1968,MartinLutherKing,Jr.,wasthetargetofanintensivecampaignbytheFederalBureauofInvestigationtoneutralizehimasaneffectivecivilrightsleader.InthewordsofthemaninchargeoftheFBI\'swaragainstDr.King,Noholdswerebarred(TheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities1976,10-11).TheideaofaCIprogramunconstrainedandengagedinanoholdsbarredapproachtoitsoperationsrevealstheextenttowhichcounterintelligenceoperationswerewithoutethicalguidelinesorframework.FBIAssistantDirectorWilliamSullivantestifiedthatneveroncedidIhearanybody,includingmyself,raisethequestion:Isthiscourseofactionwhichwehaveagreeduponlawful,isitlegal,isitethicalormoral.Wenevergaveanythoughttothislineofreasoning,becausewewerejustnaturallypragmatic(TheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities1976,14).PragmatismaloneguidedtheFBIsCOINTELPROinthewordsofSullivan.AstheSelectCommitteepointedoutinitsfindingsin1976,thequestionraisedbyintelligenceofficerswasusuallynotwhetheraparticularprogramwaslegalorethical,butwhetheritworked(TheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities1976,138).ItwasoftentheviewofCIagentsthatinintelligence,thestakesinvolvedandtheinterestofnationalsecuritymaypermitamoretolerantinterpretationofmoral-ethicalvalues(TheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities1976,144).Sullivanstatedthatofficerstypicallyhadawarpsychology,meaningthattheyoperatedundertheassumptionthat,indeed,noholdsarebarred(TheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities1976,144).ThepointmadebySullivanwasthatagentsinCIactedwithoutaskingmoralquestionsinthesamewayasoldierfiresupontheenemywithoutaskingwhetherwhatheisdoingisjustorunjust:hefiresbecausehehasbeentoldheisatwar.ThiscultureofwarisonethathelpstoexplainthepathologyofCIagentsunderAngleton,inthePhoenixProgram,andinCOINTELPRO.ItexplainsthetransgressionsmadebyAngletonsCIdepartmentduringOperationCHAOS,inwhichtherecruitingandtrainingofdoubleagentsinthedomesticantiwarmovementledtoillegalspyingondomesticcitizens(Valentine2016).OperationCHAOSwasitselfanoutgrowthofthatsamewarculture:justasPhoenixledtoabusesinVietnam,OperationCHAOSledtoabusesathome.Theproblemofblurredlines:themandatetodeceivebecameviewedasamandatetodomuchmore.Therewasnooversight,andDirectorColbywasessentiallyforcedtoscapegoatAngletononlyafterNixonsplumberswerearrestedandtheWatergatescandalerupted(Valentine2016).Solongasoperationscouldbejustifiedviatheweareatwarargument,theonlythingthatmatteredwasefficiency.MarkFelt,anotherAssistantFBIDirector,testifiedthathisjobwastoensurethatBureauprogramswerebeingoperatedefficiently,notconstitutionally(TheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities1976,155).Efficiencywastheorderoftheday.WereCImethodsefficient?Thatwasthesubjectivequestionthoseengagedincounterintelligenceaskedthemselves.Therecertainlywasnoobjectivemoralorethicalstandardbywhichtheycouldjudgethevirtueoftheiractions.ThissamequestionofwhatworkedbestwastheoneaskedroutinelybyagentsoftheFBN,asformerFBNagentDeanUnkefer(2013)shows.TheFBNwasguidedsimilarlytotheFBIandCIAbyawhollypragmaticapproachtodrugenforcement,anditsuseofCIwasnodifferentfromthatoftheFBIorthePhoenixProgram.Ifalieordeceptiongotthejobdone,FBNagentsconsidereditagoodone,regardlessofhowimmoral,corrupting,messy,deadlyorextra-legaltheoutcome.CIintheFBNTomakecases,FBNagentsroutinelyactedasdrugbuyersordealers(Unkefer2013;Valentine2006).Theyinfiltratedmobrings,mafiafamilies,andentirecommunities;theyuseddeceptiontoensnaredrugtraffickersfordecades.Agentscutheroinandgaveitawaytoinformantsinexchangeforsecretsandloyalty;theykeptanddivideddrugmoneyamongstthemselvesanduseditbothtobuyoffotheractorsandfundlavishlifestyles(Unkefer2013).Inmanycases,theirdeceptionledtostartlinglyviolentconclusions.Inanyevent,theagentswereguidednotbyastandardofethicsbutratherbyapragmaticsenseofduty:theirdutywastostopdrugtraffickersbyanymeansnecessary.Skimmingoffthetopwastheirjustreward,manyagentsfelt,fordoingthedirtyworktheAmericangovernmentdemandedofthemyetwasdisinclinedtoremuneratetoanysubstantialdegree(Unkefer2013).Itwaspartlythisany-means-necessaryapproachthateventuallyledtotheundoingoftheFBN(Valentine2006).TheotherreasonfortheFBNsundoing,asValentine(2006)showswasthatitwasincrediblyeffectiveinachievingitsgoal.Itspragmatic,typicallyamoralandunethicalapproachtoinfiltratinganddestroyingthedrugtrade,eventuallycauseditsagentstorunafouloftheCIA,whichorganizationworkedcloselywithdrugtraffickersforitsownintelligenceandCIpurposes(Valentine2006).TheCIApulledmoreweightinthehierarchyofgovernment,andthuswhentheCIAsawitsownoperationsthreatenedbytheFBNsaggressivebuteffectivetactics,theCIAinitiatedanassaultontheFBNbywayofanethicscommittee.Essentially,whatledtotheFBNssuccesswasalsowhatledtoitsdownfall:agentswereturnedoneagainstanotherasanethicsprobeturnedthebureauinside-out,broughtchargesandconvictionsagainstseveralagents,andeventuallydismantledthebureaualtogether(Unkefer2013;Valentine2006).AconflictofinterestexistedatthestructuralandfunctionallevelsoftheFBNaswell.HenryAnslinger,whoheadedtheFBNfrom1930intothe1960s,hadtosatisfymultiplestakeholders,allofwhomheldcontradictorydesires(Valentine2006).Theestablished,well-connectedfamilies,whoseaccrualofwealthduringtherobberbaronerahadmadethempowerful,lookedtoAnslingerasakindofgatekeeper.ThedrugtradewasstilllicitinChinawhentheFBNwascreated,andthesefamiliesmademillionspartakinginthattrade,usingchannelsandworkingwithactorswhoalsoparticipatedintheillicittraffickingofdrugsintotheWest(Valentine2006).AnslingerwasessentiallyappointedtohisroleasheadoftheFBNbecausehehadmarriedintooneoftheseestablishedfamilies.Hewouldmakesurethatwhilethewarondrugswasprosecuted,theirinterestsabroadwouldnotbeinterferedwith(Valentine2006).Atthesametime,Anslingerhadtoappeasetheprohibitioniststaskedwithoverseeinghisperformance.Ifhedidnotproducecases,hecouldnotjustifytherequestforfundingorlegitimatetheneedforhisownjob.Caseswerethusencouragedtobemadeagainstaddictsandlowerleveldistributors,butthemajortraffickerswereessentiallyofflimits(Valentine2006).ThisinturnledtoaculturewithintheFBNofwhereinagentshadtodeceiveandlureaddictsandlowleveldealers,flipthemintobecominginformants(oftenthroughblackmail),andengageinillegalactivitythemselvesbothtoensuretheircoverswerenotblownandtoexactadegreeofstreetjusticeinlieuoftheprosecutorsandjudges(perceivedtobeonthetake)supportingtheirworkwithconvictions(Unkefer2013;Valentine2006).UnderAnslinger,CIintheFBNwasusedinasimilarno-holds-barredmannertothatoftheCIAunderAngleton.Becausethedegreeofdeceptionusedbycase-makingagentsintheFBNwentbeyondtheirlegalmandate,reportswereroutinelyfalsified(Unkefer2013).AngletonalsofalsifiedreportsinattemptstopreventmolesintheCIAfromobtainingaccuratedata(Morley2017).Deceptionwasusedinthisregard,notjustagainstadversaries,butagainsttheStateforwhichtheseagencieswereworking.Deceptionraninbothdirectionsandonlytheagentspracticingthedeceptionknewthetruthofthematter.WhenFBNagentsbeganmakingbiggercasesagainstmajortraffickers,thusthreateningtherelationshipswithinthetradefosteredbythewell-connectedfamiliesandtheCIA(whichalsorelieduponthesetraffickersforintelligenceandforcovertoperations)acrackdownontheFBNensued(Unkefer2013;Valentine2006).ThejustificationforthecrackdownwastheagencysuseofdeceptionagainsttheState.Theno-holds-barredapproacheventuallycamebacktobitetheFBNjustasitdidAngletonsCIunit.Anslingerhaddonehisbesttoignorecriminalactivityofalliesoftheestablishedfamiliesthatheansweredto,particularlyinthe1934caseoftheTransportesAereosCentro-Americanos(TACA)HonduranGunsforDrugsscandal,inwhichvariousagenciesprotecteddrugsmugglerstoensurenationalsecurity,aswellastoprotectcorporateprofits(Valentine2006,33).Anslingerhadtowalkatightropebetweenfulfillinghismandateandlookingtheotherwaywhenhisworkthreatenedtointerferewiththeaffairsofgroupswithspecialinterests,groupstowhomhehimselfowedhiscareerandfortune(Valentine2006).ConflictsofinterestatthetopcontributedtotheFBNsdemise.DiscussionThecultureofdeceptionutilizedbytheMossadundoubtedlyplayedapartinthedevelopmentoftheCIcultureunderAngleton,asthelatterwashighlyinfluencedbyMossadagencypersonnel,asMorley(2017)hasshown.However,theframeofreferenceusedbytheMossadwasnotconsistentwiththatoftheAmericanintelligenceofficer:theMossadsmissionwastousedeceptiontoaidIsrael;byworkingcloselywiththeMossad,AngletonpotentiallymadehimselfanunwittingassetandpawnintheCImaneuversofIsrael.AngletonsapparentobtusenesswithrespecttothetruenatureoftheRingofFiveandtheproblematicnatureoftheSovietdefectorsinthe1960sisbestunderstoodifoneconsidersthatAngletonreliedoninformationfromhisMossadassociatesassociateswhoofferedlittleintelligenceonthesematters,saveapassingreferencetoPhilbysdubiousloyalties(Morley2018).AngletonsimplyhadnotestablishedaclearframeofreferencefortheCIprograminAmericaandrelieduponforeignactors,withadubiousreputationthemselves.Intermsofanethicalstandard,hisownegoismservedastheframeofreference,and,likemanyotheragentsatthetime,hisdependencyuponalcoholdidnotsupportegoasasuitablereferencepoint(Morley2017,74).Angletonlackedanobjectiveframeworkoutsidehimself:therewasnoethicalframeworkemployedatall;ethicsweresupposed,butassumptionledtolaterunwelcomerevelationsandagreatdealofinsecurity,confusionandcontradictorynarrativeswhentheChurchCommitteebeganinvestigatingAngletonsworkoftheprevioustwodecades.ThesameproblemoccurredforAnslingerandtheFBN.Anslingerhadnoethicalreferencepoint,noethicalstandardthatwasusedtoestablishaclearandacceptablecodeofconductwithrespecttoCI.ThePhoenixProgramlikewisesufferedfromsuchalackofanethicalframework,andtheFBIsCOINTELPROalongwiththebroaderumbrellaOperationCHAOSsufferedinthesameway.IneachofthesecasesoneseesCIagentsgoingbeyondthemandateofoperatingtodeceivetheadversary;killing,torture,rape,trafficking,falsificationofreports,spyingondomesticcitizensallofthisresultedfromthelackofanymoralorethicalconstraints.Timeandagain,agentsfromeachofthesecasesviewedwhatworkedbestasthecriteriaforjudgingthevirtueofonesactions.Theseagentsbelievedthemselvestobeatwar,acrosstheboard,whethertheywereintheFBN,engagedinPhoenix,workinginCOINTELPROorattemptingtoferretoutmolsintheCIA.Becausetheyconsideredthemselvesatwar,theybelievedallwasfair.Theyhadasubjectiveethicalapproachtotheirworkthatintheendunderminedtheirmissionsandsabotagedtheirownaims.EthicalPerspectivesThoughtheCIactivitiesdescribedhereinweretypicallyviewedasguidedbypragmatism,theethicalperspectivethatbestexplainsthemisEthicalEgoism:anends-justify-the-meansapproachtoCIactivitieswasroutinelyusedtojustifyanyandallformsofpolicies,programsandextra-legalinitiatives.BeginningfromthestandpointofLockeanethics,itcanbeseenhowagentsassumedtheywereatlibertytoconductthemselvesastheybestsawfitinatimeofwar.Eachagencyorunitsawitsactionsasbeingpartofabroaderwar.TherelevanceoftheColdWartothisviewpointisimportanttoconsider,astheColdWarmentalityundoubtedlyshapedtheminthisthinking.However,thelicensetoengageinactionsbothunconstitutionalandimmoralwasnevergrantedthem.Whetheragentsendedupbeingprosecutedforcrimesornot,theirmissionwascorruptedorunderminedbyalackofself-imposedconstraint.Sincetheysawnoimpetustoimposesuchconstraints,itcanbeconcludedthatsomeexternalandobjectivestandardwasneededandyetnoneexisted.Onecouldarguethattheactivitiesoftheagentsalignedwiththeirownpersonalsenseofdutyethics:agentsintheFBNbelievedittheirdutytoprosecutethewarondrugsandnothingwasofflimitsinCIthatfacilitatedthisprosecution;thesamebeliefexistedforagentsoperatingunderPhoenixandCOINTELPRObutwithrespecttoCommunistadversariesandanti-waractivists,respectively;thesamebeliefexistedforAngletonbutwithrespecttohimselfandpossiblytohisIsraelifriendsintheMossad.Ontheotherhand,itcouldbearguedthattheagentswereactinginamannerconsistentwithutilitarianethics.Theyfrequentlyalludedtoapragmaticcourseofactionandthattheirmeasureforevaluatingthevirtueoftheiractionswasefficiencyandperceivedeffectiveness.However,eventheutilitarianframeworkinsistsuponsomethingofanobjectivestandardwithrespecttotheconceptofthecommongood.ItishardlythecasethatamongtheCIcommunitythereexistedasenseofanobjectivecommongood:suchaconceptwasnotevenalludedtobyagentslikeSullivanorFeltintheirtestimonybeforeCongress.Individualagentsmayhavepossessedtheirownpersonalethicalcodes,consistentwiththetraditionalsystemofvirtueethicsbutunlesscodifiedattheinstitutionallevelandmandatedthroughouttheorganization,suchpersonalcodescomeupshortinthelargerpicture.Ineachofthecasesexamined,therewasneveranyevidenceofanorganizationalsystemofvirtueethicsbeingfosteredforagentstofollow.Onthecontrary,inmanycasestheoppositewasfound:agentsabusedalcohol,soldoruseddrugs,tookpartintorture,engagedinillegalactsofviolence,andfailedtoupholdtheconstitutionthatasfederalofficerstheyweresworntoprotectandserve.TheonlyethicalframeworkthatbestandmostfullyexplainstheoperationsandactionsofagentsintheCIcommunityineachofthesecasesisEthicalEgoism.ItisattheheartofAnslingersmoraldilemmawithallofhisdiversestakeholdersthatneededtobesatisfied.ItisattheheartofAngletonsapproachtoCIingeneral.ItisattheheartofPhoenix,COINTELPROandOperationCHAOS.Itrepresentstheethicalsystemembracedbyagentsthroughouttheintelligencecommunityifnotactivelypromotedasanofficialethicalframeworkbytheirorganizations.StructuralFunctionalism,ConflictTheoryandCriticalTheoryWhyshouldEthicalEgoismcometobethedominantethicalsystemoftheCIcommunityfromthebeginningon?CIintheUScannotbeunderstoodoutsidethecontextoftheColdWar.AngletonassumedcontroloftheCIAsCIdivisionattheoutsetoftheColdWar.PhoenixandCOINTELPROwerebothColdWareraprograms.AnslingerheadedtheFBNbeginningin1930butbroughttheBureauintotheColdWarera.EvenasKennedysoughttocurtailtheColdWarinthe1960s,Angletonrefusedtobelievethatapeacefulconclusionwaspossible.AngletonoperatedundertheassumptionthatSovietRussiahadamasterplantospreadcommunismthroughouttheworld,andheacceptedthosewhosestoryagreedwithhisprimaryassumption.TheproblemhereisthatitputhimatoddswiththeCommanderinChief,whowantedde-escalationanddtente.ShouldnottheheadofCIhavebeenpredisposedtosuppresshisownassumptionsinordertofacilitatetheobjectivesanddirectivesofthePresident?Clearlyaconflictexistedintheearly1960sbetweentheWhiteHouseandtheCIA,whichwasengagedinclandestineoperationsaroundtheworld,particularlyinCuba.KennedysthreattosmashtheCIAaftertheBayofPigsfiascoemphasizedthedegreetowhichtheAgencyandtheKennedyAdministrationwereatoddswithoneanother.Conflictwasnotwantingbetweenthetwo.TheassassinationofKennedyshiftedthingstosomeextent,buttherefusalofJohnsontorunforasecondfulltermgavewaytotheNixonAdministration,whichusheredinitsownhostofproblems.Beforelong,theintelligencecommunitywasattheforefrontofamajorSenateinvestigation,againfindingitselfinconflictwiththeobjectivesanddirectivesofthefederalgovernment.WhoorwhatinterestsshouldCIserve?Thatisabasicandfairquestionthatanyexistinggovernmenthasarighttoask.Inthecaseexamplesusedherein,itisoftenapparentthatCIprogramsservetheirowninterests,regardlessofwhetherornotthoseinterestsalignwiththebroaderinterestsoftheAmericanpublicortheAmericangovernment.Ifthereistobeconflict,sobeitbutcounterintelligenceworkistogoon,unobstructed;suchhasappearedtobetheoveralltheme.ItisacknowledgedbythegovernmentthatCIiscriticaltonationalsecurity,butjusthowCIshouldassistinsecuritymattershasneverbeenadequatelyestablished.OnereasonforthisisthattherehasbeennoproperoversightormanagementoftheCIcommunity.Theintelligencecommunityoperatesessentiallyautonomously.Withoutproperaccountabilitytherecannotbethetypeofenforcementnecessaryforeffectivelyimplementingacodeofconductorethicalframework.ThisistheprimarychallengefacinganyseriousapplicationofanethicalstandardtotheCIcommunity.Fromthestandpointofstructuralfunctionalism,theproblemsrundeeper.CIissituatedwithinalargerintelligenceandcovertoperationssecurityapparatus.ThisiswhyCIisoftenlinkedwiththetopicofnationalsecuritytoday.Counterintelligenceisandhasbeencoupledwithcounterterrorism,counterinsurgency,andcovertoperations;theinternationalbusinessandfinancecommunityisalargestakeholderintheintelligencecommunity;governmentsaroundtheworldareaswell.CIisthuspartofacomplicatedandintegratednetworkwithsocial,economic,andpoliticalfactorstoconsider.NotallactorsinCIlookatthemacro-environmentinwhichtheyoperate,butindividualslikeAnslingerandAngletondidhavetoconsiderthatenvironment.Theirconsiderations,perspectives,andinterpretationsofthatenvironmentarewhatledthemtomakethedecisionstheymade:forexample,AnslingerwithrespecttoTACA;AngletonwithrespecttotheGolitsynvs.Nosenkocontroversy.ThePhoenixProgramwasbornoutofaColdWarmentalityinwhichakindofcoverttotalwarwascondonedbytheheadsoftheintelligencecommunityinVietnam.AsimilarapproachwastakenwithCOINTELPROandOperationCHAOS.Thesewereactionstakenoutofconsiderationforpreservationofthestatusquoarrangementbetweenestablishedfamilies,governments,andinstitutions.Topreservethatstatusquoarrangement,theintelligencecommunitywentontheoffensive.TheCIcommunitywasliterallyalongfortheride,withoutoversight,withoutconstraints,andwithoutanyspecialregardforwhatitsmandateactuallywas.TheheadsofCIhadtheirownintereststoconsideraswell.TheevidenceshowsthatbothAngletonandAnslingerlookedtheotherwaywhenperceivedalliesengagedincriminalactivity.Eachhadinterestsintermsofpersonalrelationshipsandcareerstoconsider,andthoseinterestsconflictedwiththemissionmandatedthembytheState.ThiswasalsotrueforagentsinthePhoenixProgram.Anslingerespeciallyhadtonavigateacomplicatedsetofrelationships.ViewingthesecasesfromastructuralfunctionalismperspectiveishelpfulinunderstandingtheLockeanapproachtoethicsadoptedbytheCIcommunityandhowthatapproachdriftedintoEthicalEgoism.Fromaconflicttheoryperspective,theCIcommunityemergesasconflictedcommunitypulledindifferentdirectionsatonceasvariousstakeholdersvieforcontrolofinformationalresources.Conflicttheoryistheideathatgroupsareinconflictinsocietyoverresourcesandpower:thedominantgroupcontrolstheresourcesandwantstopreventtheothergroupfromobtainingpowerandstatusinsociety.AngletonwascertainlyconcernedaboutcontrollinginformationasheadoftheCIAsCIprogram.Anslingerwasmoreconcernedwithmanagingoutcomesandsatisfyingstakeholders,whetheritwasTreasurySecretaryHenryMorganthauortheMellonsandRoosevelts(Valentine2006).Thepointisthatconflictsofinterestwereparforthecourseandtherewasnotinstitutionalizedway,noorganizationalcodeofethicsinplace,norecoursetooversightuntipublicscandalsforcedtheSenatetotakeaction,fortheCIcommunitytoadoptanobjectiveethicalframeworkconsideringtheinternalandexternalconflictswithwhichitwasfaced.TheCIcommunitywasandhasalwaysbeenreactionaryratherthanproactiveinthisrespect.Conflicttheorypositsthattherearefiniteresourcesandgroupsareinastruggleforpoweroverthoseresources.Asaresultthereisusuallyagroupthathaspowerandconsolidatesbycontrollingtheleversofjustice,politics,business,andsoon;andthereisagroupthatdoesnothavepowerthatstrugglestoobtainit.Ineachofthecasesanalyzed,thoseengagedinCIactedonbehalfofnationalsecurityandusedtheirpowertopreventchallengerstonationalsecurity,i.e.,thestatusquo,fromupsettingtheestablishedorder.ItishelpfultounderstandCIfromtheperspectiveofconflicttheory.Thisisacommunitythatisorganizedontheprincipleofsurvival:asAnslingerwellunderstood,itisnotjusttheStateintheabstractsensethatisbeingservedbyCIbutratherthegroupsthathavepowertheestablishedfamilies,theinternationalbusinessesandcartels,thepoliticalfactions,andthepowerbrokers.DeceptionisusedindifferentdirectionsbecauseultimatelytheCIcommunityservestheinterestsofdiversestakeholderswhoareattimesinconflictwithoneanother.Butinademocraticsocietycanthistypeofservicebejustifiedtocitizenswhobelievetheirgovernmentshouldservetheirinterestsfirstandforemost?WhenanalyzingtheCIcommunityfromthisstandpointthelackofanethicalframeworkappearsdeliberateandMachiavellian.Fromacriticaltheoryperspective,adeconstructionofcontemporarycultureisinorder.ValentineapproachesthetopicofCIlikeadeconstructionist,intentoninterpretingtheactionsoftheintelligencecommunityattheintersectionofcultureandpower.Ratherthanseeingitintermsofaconflictparadigm,ValentineseesCIintermsofapowerparadigm.Phoenix,COINTELPRO,OperationCHAOS,theworkoftheFBNandAngletonsCIprogramarealllimbsofthesamecontrollingbodypolitic.ThatbodypoliticisexternaltotheConstitutionthewayadeitymightbesaidtobeexternaltotheworldcreated:theDeitymadetheworldandsetitinmotionbutisnotboundbythelawsofmechanicsthatkeepitinmotion.TheConstitutioninotherwordsistheretoservethebodypolitic,nottheotherwayaround.IftheConstitutiondoesnotserveitinitsneeds,thenitneednotbeobserved.This,too,explainsthethinkingoftheCIagentsinthecaseshereindiscussed.Fromthisstandpoint,thequestionthatremainsiswhethercitizensoftheUSshouldacceptthattheyaregovernedorruledbysuchabodypoliticandsubmit,orwhethertheyhavearightoreventhemeanstoprotestanddemandachange.Assumingthelatter,itstandstoreasonthatthebodypoliticisnotfreeofcensure.Tobringthebodypoliticintoconformitywiththeruleoflaw,itisimperativethatastandardethicalframeworkbeappliedthroughouttheCIcommunity.Itisalsoassumedthatsuchwouldbetterservetheinterestsofthecommongoodthanthecurrentambiguousapproachtoethicsservestheinterestsofthebodypolitic.Ultimately,thepowerofthebodypoliticistenuous;butiftheconsentofthepeopleisgiventothebodypoliticoutofrespectforanapparentalignmentofinterests,itmaybesupposedthatamoreharmoniousglobalsocietycanbetheoutcome.Togiveanexampleofwhatthismeansineverydayterms,onemayanalyzetheissueofstructuralracism.StructuralracismexistsinAmericancivilianlifebecausethecultureofAmericansocietyhasfosteredthatstructure.Themilitarysstructureisnotelitistbutratherhierarchical;thecultureisegalitarianandprincipledbyanethicalframework.ThestructureofAmericansocietyisinherentlyracistbecauseofculturalelitismthatgoesbacktothedaysoftheFoundingFathers.AsSabo(2014)pointsout,immigrationisaperfectexampleofstructuralracismbeingaculturalissuethatimpactsallpartsoflife.Forexample,immigrationlawsthatmilitarizecommunitiesmayexacerbateethno-racialhealthdisparities,Saboargues(66).Why?Thereasonissimple:marginalizedgroupsareforcedintopoorcommunitiesandthosecommunitieshavelessaccesstohealthcare.Theresultisalossofequality.Noteveryoneisthesame.Theculturepromotesdivision.ItisasToniMorrisonshowsinhershortstoryRecitatifpeoplerememberthepastdifferently.Theyseethroughdifferenteyesbecausetheyhavedifferentculturalperspectivesthatinformthem,thatgivethemaframeworkforhowtosee.Theyareprogrammed,cognitivelyspeaking,bypeers,groupsandmedia.Soapersonwhogoesofftocollegewillhaveadifferentculturalexperiencethanapersonwhocomesofageintheslums.TheplayerwhotakesakneeduringtheNationalAnthemisdoingsobecauseheisseeingwithdifferenteyesfromtheplayerwhostandstosalutetheflag.Theymaybeonthesameside,theymaybothwantthesamethingultimately,butthedifferenceinhowtheysee,howtheyrelatetooneanother,howtheyprocesstherealityoflifearoundthemitdictatestheirpostureanddemeanor.Itdictatestheirpresenceofmind.Itdictateshowtheyseethemselvesandwhattheyseeastheirduty.BecausethereisnoculturalunificationinAmerica,playersonthesameteamcanbeinformedtobydifferentculturalperspectives,whichcreatestensionanddivision.Whatisneededisaunifiedculturalexperience,aculturethatconsistsofthesamespiritofmission.TheProtestant-JewishethicthathascometodominatetheAmericanexperienceisonethatputspeopleintodivisivecategoriesandlabels,thatpitsthemagainstoneanotherbecauseitisanethicofelitism,inwhichbothProtestantsandJewishgroupsseethemselvesasthechosenpeople.ThatcultureofelitismrunsthroughandthroughAmericancivilianlifebutitisnotfoundinthemilitary,becausethemilitaryhasmoreofahierarchicallystructuredbutultimatelyegalitarianethicalprinciple,inwhicheverypersoninthemilitaryisseenasvitalandimportant.Inacommunitywhereelitistsviewthemselvesassuperiortootherstherecanbenosuchegalitarianism.Therecanbeonlydivisionandanger,asCarbado(2005)shows.IftheissueofracialandethnicoppressioninAmericaisgoingtobeaddressed,ithastobeaddressedatthelevelofculture,asthemilitaryhasdone.Thentherewillbenomoredisputeoverwhetheroneshouldtakeakneeduringtheanthemorstandandsalutetheflag.Everyonewillhavealreadylearnedtotakeakneeintheirdailyactionstowardsoneanother,sothatwhentheanthemplaystheycanallstandwithpridetoshowtheirpatriotismforacountrythathaslearnedtostructureitselfinatrulyegalitarianway.ToaddresstheissuesofCIintheUS,onemustlookatthecultureofelitism.TheCIcommunitystraddlestheintersectionofelitismandcovertmilitaryaction.Itexistsinagrayzoneofhierarchicalorderandcarteblancheimplicitness;itisamixtureofegalitarianprinciplesandelitism.ThecultureoftheCIcommunityisthusconfused,conflicted,andschizophrenic.AsAugustineisfamousforsaying,IndubiislibertasWhenindoubt,liberty.TheCIcommunitytakesextensivelibertieswhereothersmightdefertotheruleoflawbecauseofthecultureoftheCIcommunity.Toaddresstheissueofethics,theissueofculturealsohastobeaddressed.Fromacriticaltheoryperspective,thisisthemostimportantrealizationtohave.EthicalFrameworktoApplyMostexplorationsoftheissueofethicsandCIstopshortofrecommendinganethicalframework.ThepurposeofthisresearchwastohighlighttheproblemsinCIusingcomparativecasestudyanalysisinordertofacilitatethedevelopmentofanethicalframeworkthatcouldpreventfutureconflicts.TheethicalframeworkmostofteninuseintheCIcasesexaminedisthatofEthicalEgoism.EthicalEgoismisnotaviableethicalframework,however,forthefactthatitishighlysubjective,pragmatictoadangerousdegree,andpotentiallyamoral.TheproblemofCIisnotoneofconstraintbutratheroneofunrestrainedfreedom.CIshouldbegovernedbythesameethicalstandardsthatareexpectedofanyoneinsociety.Tobeotherwiseistoinvitescandalandabuselikewhathasbeenseenalreadyinthepast.WhatshouldbethebestethicalframeworkforCI?Virtueethicsisthetraditionalethicalfoundationinboththeeastandthewest.Assuchitisworthconsideringthemeritsofavirtueethicsframework.AcasebycaseassessmentinthelightofthisethicalsystemcouldshowwhatmighthavehappeneddifferentlyhadasystemofvirtueethicsprevailedintheCIcommunityunderAngleton,inPhoenixortheFBI,orintheFBN,buthypotheticalsuppositionsasidethereisenoughargumentinfavorofapplicationofavirtueethicssystemamongresearchersandscholarstodaytoseewhythissystemisnotonlythebestbutalsoessentialforsuccess.Ethicalsystemsalreadyexist.TheLawEnforcementOathofOffice,forexample,focusesonprotecting,upholdinganddefendingtheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates.ItalsocontainstermswithintheOaththatexplainclearlyhowofficersshouldconductthemselves:theyareexpectedtoactwithsobriety,honorandhonesty.ItwastoooftenthecaseintheCIcommunityandintheFBNthatagentsactedwithnoneoftheseor,withaperceivedhonortaintedbyawarculturementalitythatmadeitentirelysubjectiveanddubious.Thereasonslawenforcmentagenciescodifytheethicstheywanttheirofficerstofollowerissimple:unlessthecodeexists,itisnotenforceableorevenpracticable.Withacodeofethicsinhand,itispossibletoguideofficersandteachthemtoengageinethicaldecisionmaking.Ethicaldecisionmakingissimplytheactofmakingtherightdecisionmorally.Officersandagentsmaypossessanunconsciousorimplicitbias,buthavingacodeofethicsinplacehelpsthemtoremembertobasetheirdecisionsontheethicalcoderatherthanonpersonalorsubjectivefeelingsandperceptions.Inhealthcaresettings,healthcareworkershavetheirowncodeofethicsaswell.Oneofthemostcommonprinciplesinhealthcareistodonoharm.Anotheristorespectthehumanrightsofthepatientatalltimes.Theseprincipleshelptoformthebasisoftheethicalsystemsapplicabletotheirfield.BecausetheCIcommunityfacesaculturalconflictinherenttoitsownenvironment,anethicalframeworkshouldfocusonculture,andthatiswherevirtueethicscomesintoplaymostfully.Inorderfortheethicalcodetobeimplementedeffectively,agentswithintheCIcommunityneedtoengageincriticalthinking.Criticalthinkingisaskillthatcanbetaughtbutitrequiresextensivetrainingandpractice,andtoooftenitcanbeneglected.Thisisfurtherreasonforwhycultureissoimportant,asculturereinforcesthenormsandbehaviorsthataresupposedtobesecondnaturetothosewithinanorganization.Agentswhousecriticalthinkingwouldtypicallyhavetoaskthemselvesaseriesofquestionswhenmakingdecisionsregardingthemoralityofcertainactionsunderconsideration.Theywouldhavetoaskiftheactionislegal,whetherithasthecommongoodasanend,whetheritispracticali.e.,hasutility;whetherthereareanybetteroptionsthatcouldpotentiallyleadtoanevengreatergood;whethertheproposedactioncontradictsorunderminesanethicalprinciple;whethertheactionviolatesthecodeofethics;whethertheactioncouldbereasonablyjustifiedbeforethepublicwereittobescrutinized.Theseareallthoughtprocessesthatwouldgointoengagingincriticalthought.TofacilitatecriticalthoughtandthedevelopmentofasuitableculturewithintheCIcommunity,asystemofvirtueethicsshouldbeimplementedandstandardized,andcharactereducationshouldbepartofthetrainingofallCIpersonnel.Gong(2010)makesthebestcaseforwhyvirtueethicsstillmatter,andhisargumentrunsthus:thesystemofvirtueethicsdevelopedintraditionalsocietybecausethegoalsofcharacterformationconformedwelltotheneedsandstructuresoftraditionalsocieties.Inmodernsocieties,themoralspirithasbecomemorediverseandpragmatictoreflectthediversedimensionsofcomplexmodernlife.However,thistransformationofthemoralspiritisproblematicbecausemodernsocietyisnolessdependentuponvirtuesthantraditionalsocieties.Infact,becauseofthecomplexityofrelationshipsandinteractionsinmodernlife,arule-basedethicalsystemisevenmoreessentialandapplicable.Self-identityisformedbyvirtues;moralcharacterisdefinedbyoneshabits,goodorbad.Asmodernsocietyhasorganizedaroundautilitarianethic,whichgiveswaytoLockeanethicsandtoEthicalEgoism,rulesthemselvesarefoundtobeinadequate(Gong2010).ThecasesofCIexaminedhereinshowasmuch:toomuchemphasisonpragmatismwhileignoringtheruleoflawisparforthecourseintheCIcasesdiscussed.Gong(2010)concludesthatvirtuesareamoralresourceformodernpeopletoresistmodernevils(255).Ifthatresourceisunavailabletoactors,theyarelimitedintermsoftheireffectivenessinachievingthegood.Alackofmoralconstraintconstrainsonesabilitytoachievegoodends.Thesystemofvirtueethicsprovidestheruleforexercisingmoralconstraintandtherebyenablingonetopursuegoodends.Characterformationisthegoalofvirtueethics.CharactereducationisthusanimportantelementofapplyingasystemofvirtueethicsintheCIcommunity.Kristjansson(2014)pointsoutthatthebasisforcharactereducationisAristotelianism.Aristotleprovidesthebasicethosofcharacterformationandhowitshouldbepursuedbyindividuals.Charactereducationshouldbeatthebedrockofanyseriousandeffectivedecisionmakingprocess,andforagentsworkingintheCIcommunitythisbedrockhastobeformedsoastopreventthekindofconflictsofinterestandabusesofpowerthatcharacterizetheCIcasesdiscussed.IfcharactereducationandvirtueethicshadbeenpromotedandfosteredintheCIcommunityfromthebeginning,thehistoryofthepastcenturycouldverywellhavebeenmuchdifferent.Thecultureofcounterintelligenceisstillyetanothermatterthatmustbeaddressed.IftheCIcommunitypersistsinexistingatthecrossroadsofegalitarianismandelitism,itwillforeverbeconflicted.WhatisneededtodayisamuchmorecollaborativespiritnotjustamongCIagenciesbutalsobetweentheCIcommunityandthebusinessworld,wheresomuchdataandintellectualpropertyisatriskasaresultoftheworldhavingmovedfirmlyintotheageofdigitalinformation.Thatcollaborativespiritcannotbeeffectedwithoutpropertraining,withoutproperassessmentofthevirtuesthatmustbecultivatedamongactors,orwithoutproperpolicyforattainingobjectives.SufficetosayanoverhauloftheculturalperspectiveofthosetaskedwithleadingnotjusttheCIcommunitybutalsointelligenceoverallissorelyneeded.Thecurrentcultureisahotbedofconflictedinterests.GovernmentintheUSisbyandforthepeople,anditmustbetheinsisteduponthattheCIcommunitysubmittotheprinciplesofdemocraticoversightandregulation.Tohaveacommunitythatrevertstopragmatismbecauseitknowsthatattheendofthedaythereisgoingtobelittleaccountability(unlesspublicscandalforcesit)isinsufficient,destructive,andantagonistictothespiritofdemocracyandfreedomthatgovernmentismeanttosupportnotundermine.Theprivatesectorrequiresconsistencyandcharacter:badactorsinthepasthavecausedcompaniestocollapse.ExamplesofthisarenotwantingfromEnrontoAndersentoBoeingalackofleadershipnamelyduetopoorcharacter,lackofethicsisalwaysatthefoundationofsuchcollapses.IftheCIcommunityistocorrectpastabusesandfacilitatetheworkoftheprivatesector,ithastoclarifyitsmission,settheparametersofitsmandatewithinitsethicalsystem,andimplementastandardizedcodeofethicsbasedonthevirtueethicssystem.ConclusionThepurposeofthisstudyhasbeentoproposeastandardizedethicalframeworkforguidingthecounterintelligenceprogramasitworkstocollaboratewiththeprivatesectorinthe21stcentury.Byusingcomparativecasestudyanalysis,ithasshownthatCIunderAngleton,CIinthePhoenixProgramandCIintheFBIsCOINTELPRO,andCIusedbytheFBNhaveallsufferedfromalackofethics.ThesecasesproblemsarebestcharacterizedasstemmingfromrelianceuponEthicalEgoism,anevolutionofLockeanEthicsandanoutgrowthofapoorlydefinedorconstrainedutilitarianism.TosupportcollaborationamongthevariousUSICmembersandtheprivatesectorinanethicalandproductivemanner,theCIcommunitymuststandardizevirtueethicsasthepreferredandessentialethicalsystem.Itmustengageincharactereducationsoastoprovideafoundationforthetypeofvirtuethatistobefostered.Itmustdevelopamoresuitablecultureinwhichthevirtueethicscansubsistandinwhichcharacterformationcanbefacilitated.ThelackofcollaborationamongtheCIagenciesisaresultofthelackoftrustandtransparency.TheblendingofCIwithotherintelligenceactivitiesisacorruptionoftheusageofCI:controversialandillegalCIactivitieshavebeenjustifiedinternallyandbeforeCongressbyappealstonationalsecurity.CIshouldnotbeconflatedwithnationalsecuritybutratherwiththeconscientioususageofdeceptiontomisleadandconfuseadversaries.However,thisobjectivemustbedonewithinthevirtueethicsframeworktopreventabuses.Deceptionisanancienttoolthathasoftenbeenusedthroughoutsocietiesaroundtheworld.Problemsarisewhenself-deceptionsetsin,orwhenonebeginsdeceivingthoseoneismeanttoserve.ThishasbeenadangerinCIfromthebeginning.Angletonfelltoself-deceptionandfailedtorecognizetowhomheowedhisloyaltiesfirstandforemost.Anlsingersoughttoservetoomanydifferentstakeholderswithdifferentinterestsandneglectedtogivehisagentsaproperethicalframework.TheFBIusedCOINTELPROtospyonAmericancitizens.PhoenixwasdesignedtogiveCIagentscarteblancheinaforeignlandwheretortureandotherillegalmeanscouldbeusedwithoutconstraint.Atnotimedidagentshaveacodeofethicsofethicalframeworktofallbackon.Atnotimedidtheyhavetopartakeofcharactereducationaspartoftheirtraining.Theyexistedinasubjectiveandambiguousgrayzoneofgovernmentwork,whereawarculturewastheonlycultureinformingthem.TofacilitatecollaborationamongthevariousCIagenciesandtheprivatesector,theCIcommunitymustestablishaclearframeworkforaccountability.Implementingavirtueethicsframeworkandinsistinguponcharactereducationandproperoversightisessential.ThisadmittedlywouldrequireatotaloverhaulintermsofhowintelligenceisapproachedintheUS,butsuchanoverhaulshouldnotbeviewedasoverwhelming;ather,itshouldbeviewedasabsolutelynecessaryforthecommongoodofthenation.Thenationismorethanjustahandfulofestablishedfamilieswithinternationalbusinessinterests.Therearemorethan300millionpeopleinAmerica,andeachofthemisastakeholder.Bycollaboratingethicallyandopenly,theCIcommunityservesthemallinturn.Bibliography2020-2022NationalCounterintelligenceStrategyoftheUnitedStates.2020.Washington,DC:NationalCounterintelligenceandSecurityCenterBailey,ChristopherandSusanM.Galich.2012.CodesofEthics:TheIntelligenceCommunity.InternationalJournalofIntelligenceEthics35(2):77-99.Bernardi,Beatrice.2013.\"TheRoleofIntelligenceintheFightAgainstInternationalTerrorism:LegalProfiles.\"Bachelor\'sthesis,UniversitCa\'FoscariVenezia.Carbado,DevonW.2005.\"Racialnaturalization.\"AmericanQuarterly57.3:633-658.Carson,ThomasL.2010.LyingandDeception:TheoryandPractice.OxfordUniversityPress.CentralIntelligenceAgency.2011.JamesJ.Angleton,AnatoliyGolitsyn,andthe\"MonsterPlot\":TheirImpactonCIAPersonnelandOperations.StudiesinIntelligence55(4):39-55.Cohen,Shlomo.2016.\"AreThereMoralLimitstoMilitaryDeception?.\"Philosophia44(4):1305-1318.Coyne,John,PeterBell,andShannonMerrington.2013.\"Exploringethicsinintelligenceandtheroleofleadership.\"InterntionalJournalofBusinessandCommerce2(10):27-37.Cram,Cleveland.1993.OfMolesandMolehunte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